This Day in History - Germany Attacks [May 10,1940 - Part 2]

The Maginot Line was France’s first line of defense against a German attack.  It was manned by half a million French soldiers.  It was the most elaborate, the most expensive set of fortifications ever built at the time.  These fortifications would halt the Germans, providing the Germans attacked in that direction.  The Maginot Line extended from the along the French border from Switzerland to Belgium.  It stopped 250 miles short of the English Channel.  The French strategists argued it best to fight the Germans in Belgium if not Germany itself.  It was too expensive to extend the Maginot Line all the way to the Channel, and the French didn’t want the Belgians to think that France would abandon them to the Germans when the attack came.  But King Leopold opted for neutrality in 1936. He closed the Belgian border to French military observers.  The French were very defensive-minded in their military thinking.  Most of their tactics were derived from the First World War.  They, like the British, didn’t want a repeat of the carnage of World War I.   The French had done much to introduce the tank and the airplane to warfare, but had done little to develop them.  They had made advancements in mechanized transport, but reverted to using horses and railways.

German thinking was just the opposite.  They too didn’t want a repeat of the First World War, especially since they’re the ones who lost it.  During the interwar years, Heinz Guderian wrote his thoughts on armored warfare in a book Achtung Panzer!  

Achtung Panzer! is not just a work of theory that was intended to help Germany prepare for the warfare of the future.  It is also a historical work.  More than half the book is dedicated to analysis of how tanks were used on the Western Front in World War I.  It emphasizes on how tanks came into existence, the technical development of tanks, the organizational development of the tanks corps, and the actual experience of tank operations.  Guderian was lucky to have a patron who agreed with him [General Oswald Lutz].  Lutz was the Inspector of the Transport Troops, which was charged with motorizing the German army.  Guderian was soon to become Lutz’s chief of staff.  It was in this job that Lutz encouraged Guderian to develop his armored warfare theories, even going as far as to order him to write a book about it [Achtung Panzer!]. 

The things Guderian wrote about in 1936-37 are commonplace today, but in his era, it was a revolution in tactical thinking.  Guderian was multilingual.  He spoke French fluently, and was almost as good at English.  He studied the works of British maneuver warfare theorists [Swinton, J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, and Giffard Martel], as well as one French tank advocate named Charles de Gaulle.  He read everything he could get ahold of from these sources, and met face-to-face with German tank veterans from World War I.  So sharp was Guderian that he became a recognized tank expert before he ever set foot in a tank.  Guderian’s thinking was close to that of Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the author of the Deep Battle doctrine [Guderian had seen Russian armor for himself], though Tukhachevsky is not mentioned by name.  Guderian had an audience [Adolf Hitler] that was more receptive to what he had to say than his British, French and Russian/Soviet counterparts.

Prior to World War I, Guderian was attached to a telegraph unit.  During World War, I he became a radio specialist and it was here he developed his appreciation for the use of “signals” as a means of enhancing command and control of armored units.  In 1930, he took command of a motor transport battalion.   This unit was equipped with some armored cars, motorcycles, anti-tank guns and dummy tanks [The Versailles Treaty forbid the Germans from having tanks].  Because the Versailles Treaty limited the size of the Reichswehr to only 100,000 men, the ten-pound brains in the German army [they weren’t allowed to have a General Staff either] had to find a way to create an effective, highly mobile force to meet contingencies.  Guderian’s unit was charged with demonstrating how different mechanized combat arms could work together.  The lessons he learned from World War I include: 1) Tanks should be used in large groups; 2) Tanks should not be wasted on unsuitable ground like swamps; 3) Tanks are best used when you have the element of surprise.  His instructions were clear – strike hard, and quickly, and don’t disperse your forces.  Hit the enemy with a fist – don’t poke them with fingers.  His thoughts about other combat arms included:

Infantry – called “the Queen of battle” by many, but not so Guderian.  He saw infantry as a supporting combat arm rather than a supported combat arm.  He thought infantry needed to be combined in fully motorized formations with other traditional supporting arms – engineers and artillery – all in support of tanks. 

Engineers – go out and find mines, provide pathways over waterways [build bridges], provide means to traverse swamps or other soft ground, reinforce bridges that are too weak to support tanks

Artillery – must be fast-moving, must be sufficiently well-protected to keep up with tanks. Suppress targets and geographical features that tanks can’t take on by themselves.  Long bombardments chew up ground, makes it difficult for tanks to maneuver, betrays the location of impending attack, permits defenders to enhance the readiness of reinforcements.  Joint training of artillery and tanks is a must. 

Aircraft – Guderian stressed the impact of airpower on operations of the Western Front.  Aircraft created disorder in German rear areas, hindered the movement of reserves, and brought German batteries under actual attack.  Because of their “great speed, range and effect on target,” aircraft became an offensive weapon of the first order. 

The French did have a plan.  If the Germans attacked through Belgium like they did in World War I, 40 French divisions, along with 10 divisions of British troops [the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)], would move into neutral Belgium to meet them.  The plan was to re-fight the First World War.  The French commander, General Gamelin, looked at the map and decided to guard the Ardennes Forest with 10 of his weakest, worst equipped divisions.  To the French, the Ardennes were impenetrable.  The Germans knew what opposed them in this sector.  They also knew the French had more tanks, better and heavier tanks, but had dispersed them throughout the army.  The Germans had a different idea. 

Erich von Manstein was Gerd von Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff when he served in Army Group A in 1939-40.  When he saw the original plan to attack France he saw a plan that was not a recipe for swift and decisive victory over the Allies.  He saw a plan in which the bulk of the attack would happen north of France through Belgium.  At first he thought it was a rerun of the Von Schlieffen Plan used to attack France in the First World War.  In that plan, the armies moved like a wheel through Belgium, sweeping along the English Channel coast and then heading south toward Paris.  Upon further review, he still saw that the northern forces [Army Group B] would head straight for the Channel coast, which would allow the Allies to counterattack its southern flank [see Map 3 below].  What he proposed [and Hitler eventually agreed to] was to shift the bulk of the attack from Army Group B to the more southern Army Group A.  While Army Group B would attack through Belgium like it would have in the original plan, a more beefed-up Army Group A would attack through the Ardennes, make a breakthrough, get into the enemy’s rear and make a dash for the Channel [see Map 4 below].  His proposal was like a Von Schlieffen Plan in reverse.  Once the breakthrough was made, Army Group A would swing to the northwest while Army Group B pressed directly west, thus catching the Allies in a pincer, cut off from the rest of France.  With the bulk of the French and British armies cut off from France, France would be ripe for the taking.  The French received reports of 50 German divisions on the move.  They even found out the day of the attack, but they preferred to “wait for events”.

The waiting ended on May 10^th.  At 5:30am, the Germans attacked neutral Holland from the air.  Their targets were the bridges over the Maas River [Meuse in France and Belgium].  The boldness of the German attack stunned the Dutch.  Dutch soldiers surrendered in large groups.  The Germans had stunning success in Belgium as well.  Glider troops landed on the roof of Fort Eben Emael, the largest fort in the world at the time, and was the lynchpin of Gamelin’s defensive line.  Gamelin moved his 50 divisions north into Belgium and Holland, straight into the trap the Germans set for them.  The column of troops heading through Luxembourg was a target-rich environment for Allied aircraft, but they were too busy covering the French/British advance into Belgium.  The Luftwaffe hit Allied airfields, catching many aircraft on the ground while they were lined up in neat rows. fThe Luftwaffe attacked Fifty Allied airfields on that first day. 

On the third day of the German offensive, the panzers reached Sedan. Of historical note, Sedan was the place where the Prussians captured French Emperor Napoleon III during the Franco-Prussian War.  Gamelin didn’t think the panzers could get that far so fast.  According to his calculations, the Germans were six days ahead of schedule.  The French had blown all the bridges over the Meuse except for one.  The Germans found a weir to cross 40 miles north of Sedan.  A panzer division commanded by Erwin Rommel found this weir relatively unguarded.  As Rommel got his tanks across the Meuse, the Luftwaffe went into action near Sedan.  Gamelin and his generals were target-fixated on what was going on in Belgium.  By the end of the fourth day of the attack [May 13^th], German infantry were across the Meuse in large numbers, and German engineers were building bridges across the Meuse to get more panzers across. 

The French tried to counterattack Army Group A, but their attacks were poorly organized.  On May 14^th, the Allied air forces attacked the German bridges over the Meuse, but Allied losses were heavy.  Only 50 percent of the planes that made the attack returned to base.  After May 14^th, the Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority.  Holland surrendered that same day.  After the German victory at Sedan, Gamelin thought the Germans would head straight for Paris, so he pulled troops away from the Meuse to protect the capital.  That move just gave the Germans more room for maneuver to make their dash for the Channel coast.  Brussels fell on May 17^th, and on that same day Gamelin was relieved.  He was replaced by General Weygand, who was recalled from virtual retirement in Syria.  A 73-year old general was replacing a 68-year old general.  The French were desperate.  Marshal Henri Petain also became Deputy Prime Minister, and he was 84.  At that time, Petain was the French Ambassador to Spain.  Before he left Spain, Petain told Franco that his country was beaten, a result of “30 years of Marxism”.  French troops surrendered by the thousands. 

On May 20^th, the Germans that had broken through at Sedan reached the English Channel.  The British withdrew to Dunkirk.  The French were not happy with the British.  On May 25^th Boulogne fell, and Calais fell the next day.  On May 28^th, news reached Paris that Belgium surrendered.  Dunkirk held out until June 4^th.  The British managed to evacuate over 300,000 troops back to Britain before then, but they left behind their tanks, their trucks, all their heavy equipment.  The evacuation was celebrated, but Churchill remarked that “wars aren’t won by evacuations.”  The panzers had time to reorganize, re-equip, and catch their breath and began the push south toward Paris on June 5^th.  After three days of fighting, Rommel reached the Seine.  On June 10^th, the French government fled Paris.  Two days after Paris fell, Petain [who by then was Prime Minister] asked the Germans for an armistice. 

Hitler insisted on using the same railroad car in Compiegne used to sign the armistice that ended World War I.  The Battle of France was over.  It took Hitler’s Wermacht five weeks to do what the Kaiser’s armies couldn’t do in four years.

Sources:
The World at War - France Falls: May-June 1940
Heinz Guderian - Achtung Panzer!
Erich von Manstein - Lost Victories

This Day in History - Churchill Takes Over [May 10,1940 - Part 1]

Two things happened on this day in 1940: 1) Germany invaded France, Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium; 2) Winston Churchill became Prime Minister of England.  Hostilities between the United Kingdom and France on one hand and Germany on the other had been ongoing since Sept. 3^rd, 1939.  Germany invaded Poland two days prior.  When Hitler’s armies occupied what was left of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, both the UK and France made guarantees to Poland that should Germany invade, they would come to their aid.  Germany did just that on Sept 1^st, 1939.  The Allied response?  Not much.  Yes, they did declare war on Germany two days later, but other than that…  There was what was called the Saar Offensive.  On Sept. 7^th, France attacked Germany in the Saar.  There wasn’t much opposition, and the French advanced about 5 miles into Germany.  Two weeks after the attack began, the French withdrew back into France.  They were content to wait for a German attack behind their Maginot Line, and thus began the eight-month “Phoney War”.  Conservative MP Leo Amery [we’ll get back to him shortly] wanted to bomb German munitions factories.  The Air Minister, Kingsley Wood, said “no” because the German factories were private property, and that the Germans would retaliate [isn’t that what you do in wartime?].

One constructive thing the British did was to bring Winston Churchill into the War Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty [the post he held at the beginning of World War I].  Churchill had been in the political wilderness as a backbencher since 1931.  He [and pretty much he alone, save for Leo Amery] criticized his own party’s government [first under Stanley Baldwin, then Baldwin’s successor Neville Chamberlain] for what he perceived as the UK’s lack of preparedness in the face of what he saw as a credible threat to the UK, namely, Nazi Germany.  He had pushed both Baldwin and Chamberlain to spend more money on armaments with limited success.  He denounced the government’s policy of appeasement.  Churchill had a sense that once the UK and France acquiesced to Adolf Hitler’s hunger for territory, Hitler would not be satisfied and would want more.  When Chamberlain and French Premier Daladier agreed to allow Hitler to have the part of Czechoslovakia known as the Sudetenland, Chamberlain believed Hitler when he told him he had no further territorial claims to make.  Chamberlain waved the piece of paper with his signature and Hitler’s, and proclaimed “peace in our time”.  Six months after that, Hitler proved Churchill to be right when he occupied the rest of what was left of Czechoslovakia.  The scales had finally fallen from Chamberlain’s eyes, hence the guarantee of support to Poland.

But first, there is a prologue to the invasion of France and the Low Countries – Norway.  While the French and the Germans were content to exchange artillery fire after the fall of Poland, the Soviet Union invaded Poland on Sept. 17^th [as discussed in a previous blog] and Finland in November 1939 [more on that in a separate blog].  Churchill, now in the government, saw much value to be gained by occupying then-neutral Norway.  He thought two things could be achieved by this move:  1) the British could stop Germany’s supply of iron ore from Sweden by occupying the northern port of Narvik; 2) Once secured, Narvik could be used as a base to help Finland against the Soviets.  It took a lot of persuasion, but Chamberlain agreed to the Norway operation.  This operation was in his mind a way to engage the Germans far from home, would have the appearance of “doing something”, and would avoid the repetition of the mass carnage of the Somme and Passchendaele from World War I.   

The RAF dropped propaganda leaflets instead of bombs on Germany in the hope there would be some “revolt of the generals” to overthrow Hitler, or he would be assassinated, and mass bloodshed could be avoided.  But by the time the British got around to going into Norway, Finland surrendered to the Soviets.  French Premier Daladier had staked his government’s survival on helping Finland.  When Finland surrendered, Daladier was replaced by Paul Reynaud.  Reynaud supported Churchill’s Norwegian plan.  The Allies agreed to mine Norwegian waters.  The mines were laid on April 8, 1940.  Chamberlain proclaimed that Hitler had “missed the bus”.  The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, taunted the Germans to “do their worst”.  Little did the British know, Hitler had his own plans for Norway.  Also, unknown to the British, the German invasion fleet sailed for Norway on April 6^th.

The German invasion of Norway began April 9^th.  They beat the British to the punch.  On that first day, the Luftwaffe took control of most Norwegian airfields.  The Germans quickly captured the coastal cities of Bergen and Trondheim, and they landed in Narvik just ahead of the British.  There the first clash between Allied forces and German forces occurred.  The Royal Navy bombarded Narvik and pummeled the German Kreigsmarine, but British troops didn’t follow-up their success with a direct assault on the town.  British troops also landed in Namsos and Andalsnes to capture Trondheim in a pincer attack.  But they had no skis, no proper maps of Norway, and no heavy guns.  Nor did they have any air support.  There wasn’t much they could do when they ran into the well-equipped Germans.  German control of the airfields was the key to the battle.  The British learned a hard lesson that sea power alone without airpower couldn’t win battles anymore.  The British withdrew from Norway and returned home.  When they got back, and angry Parliament wanted answers for why the British failed in Norway.

For nearly a year before the debate over the conduct of the war in general and the debacle in Norway there had been a building up of bitterness and anger by those who wanted Britain to go all out against the Germans.  Not only the Labour opposition but members from Chamberlain’s own Conservative party felt the conduct of the war couldn’t be carried out by Chamberlain.  During the debate, deputy Labor leader Herbert Morrison announced Labour would vote against Chamberlain when the debate was over.  For all intents and purposes, this debate was over confidence in Chamberlain’s government.  Ironically, Churchill put up a vigorous defense of Chamberlain.  Although the Norway campaign was Churchill’s idea, Chamberlain was getting the blame for its failure.  And then Leo Amery spoke.  Like Churchill, he too had been an opponent of appeasement.  He quoted Oliver Cromwell’s words –

“You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!”

David Lloyd George gave an equally damning speech about Chamberlain, and advocated that since Chamberlain had asked the British public to make sacrifices to support the war effort, that Chamberlain too should make a sacrifice.  To wit:

“He has appealed for sacrifice. The nation is prepared for every sacrifice so long as it has leadership, so long as the Government show clearly what they are aiming at and so long as the nation is confident that those who are leading it are doing their best. I say solemnly that the Prime Minister should give an example of sacrifice, because there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice the seals of office.”

After the debate finished on May 8th, the House of Commons divided.  The vote went Chamberlain’s way, but it was a pyrrhic victory.  The vote was 281-200 in Chamberlain’s favor.  The Conservatives had a 213-seat majority, but in this vote 41 Conservative MPs voted with Labour against Chamberlain, while 60 other Conservatives abstained.  Chamberlain knew that he needed to form a coalition government.  On May 9^th Labour told him they would serve in such a government, but not if he was the Prime Minister.  The choice was between Churchill and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax.  Halifax was a Peer.  No Peer had been Prime Minister in 40 years at that time.  Churchill was viewed with suspicion.  In the First World War, Gallipoli was his idea.  It was also a spectacular failure.  Chamberlain favored Halifax to succeed him.  In a meeting in the Cabinet Room at Downing Street on May 10^th, Chamberlain asked Churchill if he saw any reason why the next Prime Minister couldn’t be from the House of Lords.  Uncharacteristically, Churchill said nothing.  According to Churchill, Halifax said his position as a peer would make it difficult for him to be Prime Minister.  He would be responsible for everything, but couldn’t “guide the assembly” [the House of Commons] upon whose confidence his government would need.  

At dawn that same morning, the Germans invaded the Low Countries.    That same day, Chamberlain resigned.  Later that evening, the King sent for Winston Churchill.  Upon his arrival at Buckingham Palace, Churchill recalled:

I was taken immediately to the King.  His Majesty received me most graciously and bade me sit down.  He looked at me searchingly and quizzingly for some moments, and then said, ‘I suppose you don’t know why I have sent for you?’  Adopting his mood, I replied, ‘Sir, I simply couldn’t imagine why”.  He laughed and said ‘I want to ask you to form a Government’.  I said I would certainly do so.

Sources:

The World at War – Distant War:  September 1939 – May 1940

Winston Churchill – The Gathering Storm

Syria - Ask For Permission or Beg Forgiveness?

There’s a saying we had in the Air Force – “it’s better to beg forgiveness than to ask for permission.”  Here lies the difference between Barack Obama and Donald Trump.  On August 21, 2013, Bashar Assad gassed his own people in Ghouta, Syria.  Approximately 3,600 people were killed or injured.  A year earlier [August 20, 2012], Mr. Obama had this to say about Assad using chemical weapons on his own people:

“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”

When the attack happened, Mr. Obama said this: 

“Good afternoon, everybody. Ten days ago, the world watched in horror as men, women and children were massacred in Syria in the worst chemical weapons attack of the 21^st century.  Yesterday the United States presented a powerful case that the Syrian government was responsible for this attack on its own people.  Our intelligence shows the Assad regime and its forces preparing to use chemical weapons, launching rockets in the highly populated suburbs of Damascus, and acknowledging that a chemical weapons attack took place.  And all of this corroborates what the world can plainly see – hospitals overflowing with victims, terrible images of the dead.  All told, well over 1,000 people were murdered.  Several hundred of them were children – young girls and boys gassed to death by their own government.

This attack is an assault on human dignity.  It also presents a serious danger to our national security.  It risks making a mockery of global prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.  It endangers our friends and our partners along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq.  It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation to terrorist groups who would do our people harm.  In a world with many dangers, this menace must be confronted. 

Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets.  This would not be an open-ended intervention.  We would not put boots on the ground.  Instead, our action would be limited in duration and scope.  But I’m confident we can hold the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter this kind of behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it out.” 

Ok, so far, so good.  I won’t fault the ten days it took to respond to the attack since it takes a while for the intelligence community to put all the pieces of the puzzle together.  However, there is also this from the same statement:

“Over the last several days, we’ve heard from members of Congress who want their voices to be heard.  I absolutely agree.  So this morning, I spoke with all four congressional leaders, and they’ve agreed to schedule a debate and then vote as soon as Congress comes back into session…Yet, while I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization, I know that the country will be stronger if we take this course, and our actions will be even more effective.  We should have this debate, because the issues are too big for business as usual.”  But this was “business as usual”.  The Constitution [of which Mr. Obama was an instructor before he got into politics] authorizes the President to call special sessions of Congress while they are away on recess.  When Mr. Obama made these remarks, Congress was on its annual August recess.  If there was indeed a sense of urgency to get this done, that is not evident from neither Mr. Obama’s words nor his actions.  He let the Congressional recess continue uninterrupted – in other words, “business as usual”.  Congress didn’t return from recess until September 9^th.  In contrast, by the time Mr. Obama made these remarks, the British House of Commons had already debated the issue, and rejected authorizing military force.  The British demonstrated a sense of urgency – we did not.

What did Barack Obama want to do to Syria?  On August 29, 2013 he spoke with Judy Woodruff and Gwen Ifill [RIP] about his thinking on Syria:

“There is a reason why there is an international norm against chemical weapons. There’s a reason why consistently, you know, the rules of war have suggested that the use of chemical weapons violates Geneva Protocols. So they’re different, and we want to make sure that they are not loose in a way that ultimately, could affect our security.

And if, in fact, we can take limited, tailored approaches, not getting drawn into a long conflict, not a repetition of, you know, Iraq, which I know a lot of people are worried about but if we are saying in a clear and decisive but very limited way, we send a shot across the bow saying, stop doing this, that can have a positive impact on our national security over the long term, and may have a positive impact in the sense that chemical weapons are not used again on innocent civilians.”

But there was no US military strike on Syria.    Mr. Obama’s national security team had a tall order to sell military strikes to Congress.  John Kerry didn’t help his case by characterizing the impending strikes as “unbelievably small”.  Question – why go to so much effort to get Congress on board for something that they themselves portray as trivial?  Wouldn’t you save the arm-twisting for much bigger things?  But I digress… When asked what it would take for something that for Syria to avoid a US strike, John Kerry offhandedly said “give up your chemical weapons”.  The Russians saw their shot and they took it.  Vladimir Putin offered Barack Obama a way out.  In exchange for not striking on Syrian targets, the Russians would “convince” the Syrians to give up their chemical weapons.  Did that work?  Last week’s attack answered this question with an emphatic “No!”

   

Contrast Mr. Obama’s actions with those of Donald Trump.  On April 4, 2017, somebody [presumably the Assad regime] conducted a sarin attack on Khan Sheikoun, in the rebel-held Idlib province.  Seventy people were killed and hundreds more were injured.  On April 6^th Mr. Trump said the latest chemical attack “crosses many lines, beyond a red line, many many lines…”  The New York Times reported it took 63 hours from the time of the latest attack until the Navy launched cruise missiles at Syria.  Also according to the Times, Mr. Trump had been so shaken by the pictures shown to him [more graphic than those made public] that he needed little convincing to strike at Syria.  He didn’t ask for Congressional approval – he just did it.  There haven’t been any further attacks on Syria.  This is the “shot across the bow” that Mr. Obama described four years ago.   The effect of Mr. Trump’s action with regard to chemical weapons is unknown, but what we do know is it got Vladimir Putin’s attention.  This time it was his turn to be surprised.  According to an anonymous Obama staffer, “our administration never would have gotten this done in 48 hours.”  In his recent article for The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote Trump “reached for the same playbook that his predecessor resisted opening.”  But having taken action in Syria, where do we go from here?

There is quite a bit of political back and forth about the efficacy of Mr. Obama’s [or Mr. Trump's] Syria policy.  In the interest of staying apolitical, I won’t address those thoughts here.  But I leave with this quote from Barack Obama:

“Here's my question for every member of Congress and every member of the global community:  What message will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children to death in plain sight and pay no price?”  We’ll never know because Assad never paid a price for the August 2013 attack.  Last week’s chemical attack in Khan Sheikoun clearly demonstrated Assad didn’t pay a price, and didn’t give up all of his weapons in 2013.  Last week an airfield was knocked out of action for a little while.  Now what?

This Day in History [1933] - The Weimar Republic Dies

The usual caveat applies - I don't endorse Hitler.

Shortly after Hindenburg handed power to Adolf Hitler on January 30, 1933, Hitler persuaded Hindenburg to do something he refused to do for his predecessor [Kurt von Schleicher] only four days prior: dissolve the Reichstag and hold new elections.  The next day, Hitler addressed the nation on German radio.  In his Appeal of the Reich Government to the German People, Hitler gave a campaign speech.  He portrayed November 9, 1918 [the day the Kaiser “abdicated” and the Social Democrats proclaimed a republic] as the day the German people fell from grace.  He described the fourteen years since then as “fourteen year of Marxism” that ruined Germany, and that one year of Bolshevism would “annihilate Germany”.  He asked the German people for four years to save German farmers from “pauperism”, completely eliminate employment, and put the country’s finances on a “sound basis”.  He also vowed to “protect Christianity” and declared war on “cultural nihilism”, which he attributed to Communists.  These were themes he repeated in his February 10^th speech at Berlin’s Sportpalast.

Two days later [at the invitation of General von Blomberg] he addressed a group of senior German army officers.  At this meeting, he expressed zero tolerance of opposition and promised “extermination of Marxism root and branch”.  He told the gathering that the firmest authoritarian leadership and the “removal of the damaging cancer of democracy” [the ‘November parties’ and the Communists] was necessary for internal recovery.  He promised rearmament and a return of general conscription, and to remove the army from German internal politics.  Meanwhile in Prussia, Hermann Göring [in his role as Minister of the Interior] purged the police of non-Nazis and deputized 50,000 Stormtroopers.  This meant they could legally carry out their harassment of Communists with impunity.  The Reichstag Fire decree had given Göring the legal cover to act as he did.  Within the decree, there was a brief paragraph that gave the Reich government the right to intervene in the German Länder the right to intervene in order to “restore order”.   

The Reichstag Fire happened on February 27^th, for which Hitler and his followers blamed the Communists.  Coming conveniently only one week before German voters went to the polls on March 5th, the subsequent Reichstag Fire decree – with its suspension of civil liberties and haebeas corpus– declared open season on Communists.  Thousands of Communists were jailed, others went into hiding.  These actions suppressed the Communist vote, and the Communists were effectively eliminated as a political force, though they were not banned outright.  Social Democrats [SPD] also felt the wrath of Nazi Stormtroopers.  They broke up SPD meetings, beating up speakers and audience alike.  The government also banned newspapers of the SPD and the Catholic Center Party. 

The Nazi Party got the most votes in the March 5^th election 44 percent of the vote.  But only with the help of the German National People’s Party were the Nazis able to secure a Reichstag majority.  The newly elected Reichstag met at the Potsdam Garrison Church amid much pomp and ceremony.  The ceremony was meant to portray the continuity from the old Prussian monarchical tradition [as embodied by Hindenburg’s presence] and the new Nazi regime.  Two days later, the Nazis introduced an enabling act to the Reichstag.  The Enabling Act of 1933 [called the Law to Remove the Distress of People and State] had two main provisions: it gave Hitler dictatorial powers for four years.  It could be renewed every four years by the Reichstag.  Lawmaking was taken from the Reichstag and was given to the Hitler’s cabinet [in theory – in practice, the power passed to Hitler himself]; second, Hitler didn’t need Hindenburg’s agreement under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which allowed the Reich Chancellor to rule by decree with presidential approval.

Because the law allowed for departures from the constitution, the law itself was considered a constitutional amendment.  For such a law to pass it required approval of 2/3 of those Reichstag deputies present and voting.  Hermann Göring, as Reichstag president, changed procedural rules to make it easier for the law to pass.  Under normal rules 2/3 of Reichstag membership [not just of those who just showed up and voted] was required to bring the constitutional bill to the floor for debate.  Out of 584 total members that meant 423 would have to be present.  The Social Democrats and the Communists were expected to vote against it.  By simply ignoring the 81 Communist members, Göring reduced the quorum number to 378.  For those Communist members who weren’t present [probably arrested or in hiding], Göring declared any member “absent without excuse” to be considered as “present”.  Some SPD members were arrested by the Nazis under provisions of the Reichstag Fire decree.  Additionally, the Kroll Opera House [where the Reichstag assembled after the fire] was crawling with SA Stormtroopers as an added intimidation factor.  Hitler’s coalition partners in the German National People’s Party [DNVP] were already on board with the program.  Hitler then won the support of the Catholic Center Party.  They got a “written guarantee” that included a pledge to respect the continued existence of the constituent states [Länder], the Reichstag, an independent judiciary, and the presidency. Most importantly, Hitler pledged to respect the independence of the Catholic Church in Germany.  With the Communists out of the picture that left only the SPD in opposition.

Otto Wels: The Only Man to Publicly Oppose Hitler

During the debate over the act, Hitler pleaded his case by telling the assembled members that the “Marxists” [his term for the SDP] were responsible for the sad state of German affairs, to include toppling the monarchy, fomenting revolution, assuming the “war guilt” for World War I, the hyperinflation, the high unemployment, etc.  He also explained that he wanted to completely change the German mindset and all that help shape it - the entire system of education, the theater, the cinema, literature, the press, and radio.

SPD leader Otto Wels was the only dissenting voice in the debate, the only one to oppose Hitler publicly, and to his face.  He objected to Hitler’s characterization of a willingness by the SPD to accept “war guilt” for World War I.  He painted a picture of the SPD government having only four hours to accept or reject the “war guilt” clause of the Versailles treaty, otherwise the armistice of November 11, 1918 would expire and the Allies would resume hostilities.  Wels argued that if Hitler and the Nazis actually believed the brand of Socialism that they espoused, there would be no need for an Enabling Act.  He pleaded the SPD’s case for saving the German nation immediately after World War I:  

 

“No good can come of a dictated peace; and this applies all the more to domestic affairs.  A real Volksgemeinschaft cannot be established on such a basis. That requires first of all equality of rights. May the Government guard itself against crude excesses of polemics; may it prohibit incitements to violence with rigorousness for its own part. This might be achieved if it is accomplished fairly and objectively on all sides and if one refrains from treating defeated enemies as though they were outlaws. 

Freedom and life they can take from us, but not honor. 

We Social Democrats have borne joint responsibility in the most difficult of times and have been stoned as our reward.  Our achievements in reconstructing the State and the economy and in liberating the occupied territories will prevail in history.  We have created equal rights for all and socially-oriented labor legislation. We have aided in creating a Germany in which the path to leadership is open not only to counts and barons, but also to men of the working class…

The Weimar Constitution is not a Socialist Constitution. But we adhere to the basic principles of a constitutional state, to the equality of rights, and the concept of social legislation anchored therein. We German Social Democrats solemnly pledge ourselves in this historic hour to the principles of humanity and justice, of freedom and Socialism.  No Enabling Act can give you the power to destroy ideas which are eternal and indestructible. You yourself have professed your belief in Socialism. Bismarck’s Law against Socialists has not destroyed the Social Democratic Party. Even further persecution can be a source of new strength to the German Social Democratic Party.  We hail those who are persecuted and in despair. We hail our friends in the Reich. Their steadfastness and loyalty are worthy of acclaim. The courage of their convictions, their unbroken faith - are the guarantees of a brighter future.” 

Hitler knew what Wels was going to say [he was given Wels’ remarks prior to the debate], and to this he had a retort: 

You declare that the Social Democratic Party subscribes to our foreign policy program; that it rejects the lie of war guilt; that it is against reparations. Now I may ask just one question: where was this fight during the time you had power in Germany? You once had the opportunity to dictate the law of domestic behavior to the German Volk…

You state that being stripped of power does not mean being stripped of honor.  You are right; that does not necessarily have to be the case. Even if we were divested of our power, I know we would not be divested of our honor. Thanks to having been oppressed by your party, our Movement had been stripped of power for years; it has never been stripped of honor. 

It is my conviction that we shall inoculate the German Volk with a spirit that, in view of the Volk’s defenselessness today, Mr. Deputy, will certainly never allow it to be stripped of its honor.  Here, too, it was your responsibility, you who were in power for fourteen years, to ensure that this German Volk had set an example of honor to the world. It was your responsibility to ensure that, if the rest of the world insisted upon suppressing us, at least the type of suppression the German Volk was subjected to would be one of dignity. You had the opportunity to speak out against all of the manifestations of disgrace in our Volk. You could have eliminated this treason just as easily as we will eliminate it…

Your death knell has sounded as well, and it is only because we are thinking of Germany and its distress and the requirements of national life that we appeal in this hour to the German Reichstag to give its consent to what we could have taken at any rate." 

The Enabling Act passed by a vote of 444 to 94.  Only the SPD voted against it.  In effect, the Reichstag voted itself out of existence.  And so on this date, the Weimar Republic died.  The republic's death was long, slow and painful, but the coup de grace was quick.  It took Hitler only 52 days to kill the Weimar Republic once Hindenburg handed power to him.  Hindenburg was still Reich President, but his signature on the Enabling Act of 1933 gave Hitler a free hand to do whatever he wanted.

Who is Ivan Ilyin?

I was listening to Brian Whitmore’s Power Vertical podcast from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL] the other day.  The subject was “Putin’s Russian Idea”, a “new Putinism” that is emerging as a new ideology.  To summarize this emerging ideology, Whitmore had this to say: 

“A common refrain in the ongoing conflict between Russia and the West is that unlike the Cold War, it lacked an ideological component.  I would submit, however, that this is changing, and changing rather fast.  While Putin’s Russia doesn’t have a fully-baked teleological ideology like the Soviet Union had in Marxism-Leninism, I would argue that the contours of an incipient and emerging ideology are beginning to come into focus.  At the heart of this ideology is the notion that Russia has a specific historical mission as the last bastion of traditional Christian values that have been abandoned by the West, that a strong paternalistic state and assertive foreign policy is necessary to defend these values at home and abroad.  Moreover, the Russia in this historical mission is not limited to the borders of the Russian Federation, but includes what the Kremlin calls “the Russian World”, or Russkiy Mir.  In many ways this harkens back to the ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality’ of Tsar Nicholas I.  It also draws on the thinking of White Russian émigré philosophers of the early 20^th Century like Ivan Ilyin.  And in an era where anti-establishment populism is on the rise in the West, the ‘new Putinism’ provides the Kremlin with a useful wedge issue to advance its interests.” 

Who is Ivan Ilyin?

In December 2013, Vladimir Putin gave “his” regional governors some homework for Christmas.  Note that I say “his” governors and not “Russian” governors.  Years ago, Russian governors could be elected by the people they served.  It’s an arrangement that worked like our own federation.  But now, there is only the appearance of a true federation because Putin appoints regional governors.  He can fire them anytime.  He took away that avenue of political pluralism from the Russian people.  But I digress…  Putin’s homework for all governors and senior politicians in the service of the state were three books for Christmas 2013 reading: Vladimir Solovyov’s The Justification of the Good, Nikolai Berdyaev’s The Philosophy of Inequality, and Ivan Ilyin’s Nashi Zadachi (Our Tasks).  Of the three, Ilyin was the only thinker whom Putin quoted in his speeches as president: in his presidential addresses of 2005 and 2006 and in his speech to the State Council the year after. In 2009, Putin went to the Sretensky Monastery to lay flowers on Ilyin’s grave.  Putin has an affinity for Ilyin.  Putin supervised the repatriation and reburial of Ilyin’s remains from Switzerland in 2005.  He also purchased Ilyin’s archive from Michigan State University and brought it back to Moscow.  Since Vladimir Putin went out of his way to bring Ilyin’s work and his mortal remains back to Russia, and since he wants people who work for him to get to know Ilyin’s works, I think it appropriate to dig into this early 20^th Century Russian émigré thinker. 

Information about Ilyin is scattered and somewhat hard to come by, but luckily I found a good source – Walter Laqueur.  Laqueur has long been a “go to” source for me, and he ranks with Robert Conquest and Adam Ulam for his Russian/Soviet scholarship.  His most recent work is Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West [2015].  In his discussion of all things Putin, he devoted a chapter to the “rediscovery of Ivan Ilyin.”  Ilyin was well-known among Russian émigrés in the 1920s and 1930s, faded into obscurity, and only recently has been rediscovered.  He was born in Moscow in 1883 in an upper-class family.  He studied law in Russia and Germany and wrote on Hegel, Fichte, the philosophy of law, and religious questions.  In 1922, Lenin expelled him and he settled in Germany.  He settled in Berlin and worked at the Russian Scientific Institute, primarily as a political lecturer and writer.  He devoted his time to the fight against the Bolsheviks.   He edited Mankind on the Brink of the Abyss, a collection of essays devoted to the misdeeds of the Bolsheviks.  But because Ilyin refused to write anti-Semitic propaganda for Josef Goebbels [of which the Russian Scientific Institute was a part], Ilyin was fired from his job and had to relocate again.  With the help of Sergei Rachmaninov, he moved to Switzerland, where he lived until his death in 1954.  From 1954 until the mid-2000s, Ilyin’s writings languished in obscurity until discovered by Vladimir Putin.  After Putin repatriated his remains and brought Ilyin’s archives to Moscow, almost thirty of his books have been republished in Russia. 

 

Of the three philosopher-thinker whose readings were “assigned” by Putin to the regional governors, Laqueur describes Ilyin as the “most troubling.”  The regime in search of an ideology finally found a prophet in Ivan Ilyin.  He was a monarchist, but not along the lines of a constitutional monarchy one would find in the United Kingdom, Sweden, or the Netherlands.  Ilyin’s ideal monarch was more of an authoritarian dictatorship.  Putin isn’t a monarch, but he is an authoritarian who openly embraces the Russian Orthodox Church, and for many that’s enough.  Ilyin was opposed to liberal democracy.  Ilyin was very religious.  Ilyin wrote quite a bit, but it is hard to find [as one who doesn’t read or speak Russian, it was for me, anyway].  I can find more information written about Ilyin than stuff written by him.  Of the writings I could find, here’s a summary: 

On Fascism – Fascism’s rise was a necessary reaction to Bolshevism, and was necessary and unavoidable.  It was correct because it derived from a sense of patriotism.  But the Nazis went wrong because they were pagans that were hostile to Christianity, religion, churches.  Ilyin didn’t buy into the whole “Fürher [leader] principle”, which he dubbed “Caesarism”.  His definition of “Caesarism”: “godless, irresponsible, and despotic; it holds in contempt freedom, law, legitimacy, justice and the individual rights of men. It is demagogic, terroristic and haughty; it lusts for flattery, “glory” and worship, and it sees in the people a mob and stokes its passions. Caesarism is amoral, militaristic and callous. It compromises the principle of authority and autocracy, for its rule does not prosecute state or national interests, but personal ends.” My thought is that Ilyin loves an authoritarian monarch, as long as that authoritarian is religious.  Otherwise his opposition to “Caesarism” and his love of authoritarian monarchs are incompatible.  He thought the Nazis were too totalitarian, their one-party control was a mistake and they erred when the Nazi state took over complete control of the economy.  Fascists could be authoritarian, and that was enough to combat Communism/Bolshevism and could give religion, the press, academia, art, non-Communist parties the ability to operate without being judged by a fascist regime.  He thought the demagoguery and despotism of the Nazis was wrong because they took God out of the equation.  He thought Franco and Salazar [both authoritarians but also über-Catholic] had the right idea.  Even though their authoritarian regimes were fascists, they didn’t label themselves as such.  In Ilyin’s world, it’s ok to be authoritarian as long as you’re religious.  Putin’s regime is authoritarian, and it at least pays lip service to protecting traditional Christian values. 

On Democracy – Ilyin apparently wasn’t a big fan of democracy.  He saw the “great unwashed” as easily seduced by “revolutionaries and traitors”.  Given the tenor of his remarks on the subject, one can only conclude that Ilyin thinks the huddled masses are too stupid to vote and can’t be trusted to exercise the right to vote responsibly.  For Ilyin, voting leads to rebellion.  To wit:  “Every citizen is secured the right to crooked and deceptive political paths, to disloyal and treasonous designs, to the sale of his vote, to base motives for voting, to underground plots, unseen treachery and secret dual citizenship to all those crudities which are so profitable to men and so often tempt them.  The citizen is given the unlimited right to temptation and the corruption of others, as well as the subtle transactions of self-prostitution. He is guaranteed the freedom of disingenuous, lying, and underhanded speech, and the ambiguous, calculated omission of truth; he is granted the liberty to believe liars and scoundrels or at least pretend to believe them (in self-interest simulating one political mood or its complete opposite). And for the free expression of all these spiritual seductions he is handed the ballot.”   He cited Rousseau’s teaching that man is inherently good and rational, but then he concluded the good and rational are easily tempted to do the wrong thing by voting.  So the “managed democracy” [which is a euphemism for “rigged elections”] of Putin’s Russia is part and parcel of the “strong paternal state”. 
 

On Orthodoxy – Ilyin posited the foundation of the Russian nation was the Orthodox Christian faith.  He argued that nations without faith “decayed and died.”  Orthodoxy gave Russians many things – “sympathy for the poor, the weak, the sick, the oppressed, and even the criminal…a living and profound sense of conscience; a dream of righteousness and holiness; an accurate perception of sin; the gift of a repentance that renews; the idea of ascetic catharsis; and an acute sense of “truth” and “lies,” good and evil…that spirit of sacrifice, service, patience, and loyalty, without which Russia would never have withstood its enemies and built an earthly home.”  It was Orthodoxy that gave Russians their sense of “citizen’s responsibility”, and with that responsibility a subservience to a monarch, and not just any monarch but one who would serve God.  Ilyin attributed many gifts of the “Christian sense of justice” – “a will to peace, brotherhood, justice, loyalty, and solidarity; a sense of dignity and rank; a capability for self-control and mutual respect.”  His argument boils down to this – Russians are better than everyone else because of their religion [Russian Orthodoxy], which is better than either Catholicism or Protestantism.  This speaks to Whitmore’s argument that part of the emerging ideology is that Russia has the “special mission” to uphold traditional Christian values. 

On Forms of Sovereignty – Ilyin argued that a diversity of peoples throughout the world merits a diversity in sovereignty.  He didn’t like a “one size fits all” approach to governance.  In his world, democracy doesn’t work everywhere [“There are no identical peoples, and there should not be identical forms of sovereignty and constitutions. Blind borrowing and imitation is absurd, dangerous, and can become ruinous”].  Ilyin argued that for those states that are used to being ruled by a monarchy for centuries, it’s irresponsible to force a republican form of government upon them.  And so the deposition of the Tsar in 1917 in favor of some kind of democracy was a mistake.  The Bolshevik Revolution compounded that mistake.  A democratic, federated republic is not a good fit for Russia.  Political elections are ruinous, and Ilyin asserted the only way for Russia is a “national, patriotic, hardly totalitarian, but authoritarian dictatorship.”  Again, this gets back to the “managed democracy” of Putin’s Russia. 

There is no single “playbook” for Putin’s emerging ideology like Marx’s Communist Manifesto was for Communism, but Ilyin’s writings are a good place to start when trying to understand why Putin and his ilk do what they do.

This Day in History (1933) – The Reichstag Fire

The usual caveat applies - I don't endorse Hitler.

The day after Adolf Hitler took power, Josef Goebbles wrote the following in his diary:

“During discussions with the Führer we drew up the plans of battle against the red terror. For the time being, we decided against any direct countermeasures. The Bolshevik rebellion must first of all flare up; only then shall we hit back.”

Five days after Hitler took power [4 Feb 1933], his cabinet issued a decree [ratified by President Hindenburg] named Decree for the Protection of the German People.  This decree placed constraints on the press and authorized the police to ban political meetings and marches, effectively hindering electoral campaigning.  Hermann Göring, who had become acting Interior Minister and thus head of the police in Prussia, recruited 50,000 SA and SS members into the police. The ensuing campaign of violence and terror was waged against Communists and other Nazi opponents [the Social Democrats were a close second to the Communists in taking Nazi abuse].  The SA’s job was to fight in the streets, break heads/legs/any other body parts, to break up meetings of opposing political parties, and to cause general mayhem.   On February 24th, the Gestapo raided Communist headquarters. Hermann Göring claimed that he had found "barrels of incriminating material concerning plans for a world revolution".  However, the alleged subversive documents were never published. 

Then, on February 27^th, the Reichstag burned.  Conveniently, this was only a week before the March 5^th election.  A young Communist named Marinus van der Lubbe [who was a Communist until 1929] was apprehended at the scene.   Van der Lubbe made a full confession, but there were [and still are] many skeptics.  The UK’s Daily Express, Seftan Delmer opined the next day that the Nazis set the fire.  Fifteen months after the fire, an SA Gruppenführer named Karl Ernst confessed he and a group of fellow SA members set the blaze [William L. Shirer wrote as much in his The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich].  Regardless of who set the blaze, Hitler had his pretext for dealing with the Communists in his own way.  He initially wanted to shoot all the Communists.  The following day, the government issued its Reichstag Fire Decree.  Thousands of Communists were rounded up and thrown into jail.  Those who couldn’t be found went into hiding.

Marinus van der Lubbe

Karl Ernst

Here’s the Reichstag Fire Decree in its entirety.  For what the Nazis wanted to do, they didn’t need a lot of words – they just came right out and said it.  Gone were the days one could do anything he wanted, associate with anyone he wanted.  The German state could tap your phones and read your mail.  The state could search your house.  The state could seize any or all of your property.  They could do all of this without the niceties of getting a warrant.  The police state was born here.  The Weimar Republic's days were numbered.

Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State of 28. February 1933

On the basis of Article 48, Section 2, of the German Constitution, the following is decreed as a defensive measure against Communist acts of violence that endanger the state:

§ 1

Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on the right of assembly and the right of association, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications, and warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property are permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.

§ 2

If any state fails to take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order, the Reich government may temporarily take over the powers of the highest state authority.

§ 3

State and local authorities must obey the orders decreed by the Reich government on the basis of § 2.

§ 4

Whoever provokes, appeals for, or incites the disobedience of the orders given out by the supreme state authorities or the authorities subject to them for the execution of this decree, or the orders given by the Reich government according to § 2, can be punished – insofar as the deed is not covered by other decrees with more severe punishments – with imprisonment of not less than one month, or with a fine from 150 to 15,000 Reichsmarks.

Whoever endangers human life by violating § 1 is to be punished by sentence to a penitentiary, under mitigating circumstances with imprisonment of not less than six months and, when the violation causes the death of a person, with death, under mitigating circumstances with a penitentiary sentence of not less than two years. In addition, the sentence may include the confiscation of property.

Whoever provokes or incites an act contrary to the public welfare is to be punished with a penitentiary sentence, under mitigating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than three months.

§ 5

The crimes which under the Criminal Code are punishable with life in a penitentiary are to be punished with death: i.e., in Sections 81 (high treason), 229 (poisoning), 306 (arson), 311 (explosion), 312 (flooding), 315, paragraph 2 (damage to railways), 324 (general public endangerment through poison).

Insofar as a more severe punishment has not been previously provided for, the following are punishable with death or with life imprisonment or with imprisonment not to exceed 15 years:

1. Anyone who undertakes to kill the Reich President or a member or a commissioner of the Reich government or of a state government, or provokes such a killing, or agrees to commit it, or accepts such an offer, or conspires with another for such a murder;

2. Anyone who under Section 115, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code (serious rioting) or of Section 125, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code (serious disturbance of the peace) commits these acts with arms or cooperates consciously and intentionally with an armed person;

3. Anyone who commits a kidnapping under Section 239 of the Criminal Code with the intention of making use of the kidnapped person as a hostage in the political struggle.

§ 6

This decree enters into force on the day of its promulgation.

Berlin, 28. February 1933

The Reich President von Hindenburg

The Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of the Interior Frick

The Reich Minister of Justice Dr. Gürtner

The following are the articles of the Weimar Constitution that were affected by the Reichstag Fire Decree:

Article 114 The rights of the individual are inviolable. Limitation or deprivation of individual liberty is admissible only if based on laws. Persons deprived of their liberty have to be notified, at the next day on the latest, by which authority and based on which reasons the deprivation of their liberty has been ordered; immediately they have to be given the opportunity to protest against the deprivation of liberty.

Article 115 Every German's home is an asylum and inviolable. Exceptions are admissible only if based on a law.

Article 117 Privacy of correspondence, of mail, telegraphs and telephone are inviolable. Exceptions are admissible only if based on a Reich law. Article 118 Every German is entitled, within the bounds set by general law, to express his opinion freely in word, writing, print, image or otherwise. No job contract may obstruct him in the exercise of this right; nobody may put him at a disadvantage if he makes use of this right. There is no censorship; in case of the cinema, other regulations may be established by law. Also in order to combat trashy and obscene literature, as well as for the protection of the youth in public exhibitions and performances legal measures are permissible.

Article 123 All Germans have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed; such assemblies do not require any prior notification or special permit. A Reich law can require prior notification for assemblies taking place in the open, and it can, in case of imminent danger for public security, stipulate that such assemblies in the open may be prohibited. Article 124 All Germans are entitled, for means which do not conflict with penal laws, to form clubs or societies. This right may not be limited by preventive measures. These regulations also apply for religious societies. Every club is free to acquire legal capacity. No club may be denied of it because of it pursuing political, socio-political or religious goals.

Article 153 Property is guaranteed by the constitution. Laws determine its content and limitation. Expropriation may only be decreed based on valid laws and for the purpose of public welfare. It has to be executed with appropriate compensation, unless specified otherwise by Reich law. Regarding the amount of the compensation, the course of law at general courts has to be kept open in case of a controversy, unless Reich laws specify otherwise. Expropriations by the Reich at the expense of the states, communities or charitable organizations may only be executed if accompanied by appropriate compensation. Property obliges. Its use shall simultaneously be service for the common best. Coming March 23rd:  The Enabling Act