Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Monday, July 24, 2017

Turkey Since the Coup

Imagine if you will a country that is absorbing terrorist attacks from several organizations, both from within and from outside the country.  Imagine that same country is a temporary home to over 3 million refugees that have escaped a crippling civil war in a neighboring country.  Imagine that same country is enduring a political struggle that could potentially tear the country apart.  And finally, imagine that country has military elements that tried to overthrow a democratically-elected government.    There is such a country that fits all of those descriptions – that country is Turkey.

It has been a little more than a year since dissident elements of the Turkish military attempted a coup to overthrow the regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on July 15, 2016.  Much has happened in that country since the attempted coup failed.  The country has endured numerous terror attacks from several different groups.  The government has purged [and continues to purge] many sectors of Turkish government and Turkish life from what they call “The Deep State,” members of which the Turkish government claims to be behind the abortive coup, namely the Gülen movement.  Most significantly, the country held a constitutional referendum to decide what kind of government the country will have.

When he was Barack Obama’s first Chief of Staff, Rahm Emmanuel was often attributed as the one who uttered the phrase “don’t let a good crisis go to waste.”   An attempt to remove a duly elected President from office by force is about as big a crisis one can think of in a democracy.  As the coup attempt was in its early stages, I asked the following question on Facebook:

Wondering if this coup in Turkey will turn out like the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991...”

As fate would have it, the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey proved to be just as inept as that tried in the Soviet Union in August 1991.  The plotters failed miserably.  Erdoğan is still in power.  In commemorating the coup attempt’s failure, Erdoğan vowed that “we will chop off the heads of those traitors” if the Turkish parliament passed a bill to restore capital punishment to Turkey. 

Suffice to say, Erdoğan is not letting this crisis go to waste.  The night the coup collapsed, Erdoğan referred to the attempted coup as a “gift from God.”  The “gift” was to Erdoğan, who has used the coup as a pretext to cement his grip on power.  He has repeatedly demonstrated a thin skin in the face of criticism and satire, and has shown no reluctance to user the levers of state power to settle scores.

State of Emergency
Article 120 of the Turkish constitution allows the President, with the consent of parliament, to declare a state of emergency.  The first declaration of this state of emergency was for three months, and has been extended three times since its imposition on July 20, 2017.  The state of emergency allows resident to rule by decrees that have the force of law.  At first the state of emergency was going to last only three months.  But not, Erdoğan says it could last indefinitely.  He hasn’t locked up all of his actual and perceived enemies yet, so that could take a while.

Terrorist Attacks
New York Times writer Patrick Kingsley described Turkey as “a nation under pressure”.  Turkey is fighting two different terrorist campaigns – one led by the Kurds, the other by ISIS.  There were several acts of terrorism committed both before and after the July 15th coup attempt.  Some of these included the following:

•           Atatürk Airport attack – June 28 – 45 killed, >230 injured [Nobody claimed credit, Turkey suspects ISIS]
•           Ankara car bombing – February 17 – 29 killed [14 Turkish soldiers], 60 injured - Kurdistan Freedom Hawks [TAK] claimed responsibility
•           Ankara car bombing – March 13 – 37 killed, 127 injured - Kurdistan Freedom Hawks [TAK] claimed responsibility
•           Kurdish wedding, Gaziantep, Turkey. – August 20 – 57 killed, 66 injured [Both ISIS and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) blamed, nobody claimed credit]
•           Diyarbakır bombings in February [6 killed, 1 injured], March [7 killed, 27 injured], May [3 killed, 45 injured] , and November 2016 [11 killed, 45 injured] – ISIS claimed responsibility
•           Kayseri car bombing – December 17 – 14 Turkish soldiers killed, 55 injured - Kurdistan Freedom Hawks [TAK] claimed responsibility
•           Istanbul car bombings – December 10 – 48 killed [36 were police officers], 166 injured - Kurdistan Freedom Hawks [TAK] claimed responsibility
•           Şemdinli car bombing – October 9 – 15 killed [10 Turkish soldiers], 27 injured -  PKK's armed wing HPG claimed responsibility

One can imagine the anxiety level of our own population and leadership if attacks like these happened here.  But in Turkey, the charge of “supporting terrorism” is very broad-based and is used by Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) to silence its critics.  Those critics include journalists, many of whom have been imprisoned by the AKP government.  This issue of press freedom is but one sticking point between the EU and Turkey, which has been trying to gain EU membership since 1987.

The Migrant Crisis
Migrants/refugees started to surge into Europe as a result of the Arab Spring in 2011.  Since the Syrian Civil War began later that same year, more than 5 million Syrians have fled their country seeking shelter.  As a front-line state in that conflict, Turkey alone is sheltering over 3 million of them, and they are overwhelmed.  According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are approximately 950,000 total pending asylum application for asylum pending in Europe.  Germany and Sweden have open immigration policies and the most generous asylum policies in the European Union.  Those two countries account for approximately 64 percent of those asylum applications.  However, Eastern European states like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have all expressed their desire to take in only non-Muslim refugees.  France and Denmark are hesitant to take in migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, citing security concerns in the wake of Muslim terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen. 

The EU as a whole isn’t exactly welcoming Syrian refugees with open arms.  President Erdoğan complained the EU wasn’t doing enough to help Turkey deal with the problem.  The EU and Turkey struck a deal over the migrant issue.  In return for €6 billion from the EU, Turkey will block the flow of asylum seekers to Europe.  Turkey also desires visa-free access to the EU for Turks.  The promise of visa-free European travel for Turks is a key incentive in the migrant deal, but Turkey says the EU must change its conditions for the visa concession.   Erdoğan accused the EU "hypocrisy" for telling Ankara to adapt its counter-terror laws in return for visa-free travel while it was fighting the PKK.  Erdoğan never misses an opportunity to remind that any slight to Turkey or himself personally [whether actual or perceived] could put the migrant deal with the EU in jeopardy. 

The Purge
In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup, 20,000 teachers and administrators were suspended from their jobs.  More than 2,700 judges and prosecutors were removed from their jobs, as were 6,000 soldiers.  All were considered by the government to be allied with Fethullah Gülen.  This tells me this was like the Nazi Party’s Night of the Long Knives in 1934 [only nobody was killed here]  – the AKP had their lists ready, and needed an excuse to act to remove perceived political opponents from their places of employment.

Patrick Kingsley described the ongoing purge this way:

“Many in Turkey feel little pity for the Gülenists. For years, the group’s members kept a firm grip on the country’s justice system and education sector. And when they were still allied with the government, their cadres in the judiciary were accused of persecuting secular soldiers and politicians in a purge that draws comparisons to Mr. Erdoğan’s crackdown today. The government describes the Gülen movement as a carefully structured conspiracy with a secret leadership that aims to infiltrate and take over the Turkish bureaucracy, and even those of the dozens of foreign nations, like the United States, where it owns schools.”

A group of journalists who say they are “a small group of young journalists who are trying to be the voice for Turkish people who suffer under an oppressive regime” maintain a website called Turkeypurge.com.  This website tracks the purge of officials within the Turkish state bureaucracy, military, and civilians alleged to have links to Fethullah Gülen, the Turkish cleric who used to be allied with Erdoğan.  Gülen is now accused of being the mastermind behind the failed coup.  They keep track of “daily account of academics, military officers, police officers, teachers, government officials and bureaucrats who have been dismissed from their jobs as part of the ongoing purge.” 

As of July 19, 2017, their totals include:

State officials, teachers, bureaucrats, and academics who were dismissed by gov’t decrees, teachers whose licenses were revoked by Turkey’s Education Ministry, academics who lost their jobs by gov’t decrees, and dismissed military personnel:  145,711

Detained:  120,117

Arrested: 56,114

Judges & prosecutors dismissed:  4,424

Media outlets shut down: 149

Journalists arrested:  269

Universities closed:  15

7,316 academics working at 108 universities across Turkey

Eleven pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party HDP lawmakers have detained on charges of having ties to the outlawed militant group the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).  The party claims that since parliamentary immunity was lifted earlier this year, the central government has systematically tried to destroy it through arrests and erroneous claims that it supports the PKK.  The government has also arrested hundreds of HDP party workers across the country.  This is part of a campaign that has seen pro-Kurdish members of parliament, writers, and elected city mayors imprisoned on charges of sympathizing with the banned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).  The PKK has actively promoted an autonomous Kurdish region and led an armed insurrection against the Turkish government since 1984.  Both the United States and the EU list the PKK as a terrorist organization.  The HDP denies involvement with the PKK, but has expressed support for government-PKK peace talks.

But in Turkey, the charge of “supporting terrorism” is very broad-based and is used by Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) to silence its critics.

The Referendum
In January 2017, the Turkish parliament passed a package of constitutional amendments to greatly expand the powers of the presidency.  The amendments greatly expand the powers of the presidency.  Until now, the post of president was ceremonial, with executive authority resting with a prime minister.  The presidency was also a non-partisan post.  The amendments allow the president to be a member of a political party.  The president will have authority over all executive branch institutions, including the military.  It would give the president the power to appoint key senior-level judges and other judicial officials without parliamentary—or any other—review. He would also be able to issue decrees with the force of law in many areas of Turkish life, particularly regarding economic and social concerns—unless Parliament acted to override the decrees. It would abolish the post of prime minister, with the president assuming the powers of that office. And it would allow, under certain circumstances, the president to serve three terms totaling just short of 15 years.  One of the amendments involves creating an additional 50 seats in the Turkish parliament [from 550 to 600], which could enable Erdoğan to carve out a geographical advantage for the AKP to obtain a critical two-thirds majority in future elections.  The potential is there for Turkey to turn into a one-party state.  The EU isn’t pleased.

On April 16, the amendments narrowly passed.  Fifty-one percent of Turkish citizens voted “yes”.  Just as the votes were being counted, the High Electoral Board (YSK) stated that ballots without the official stamps would be counted. This, of course, quickly raised a red flag.  The result – Turkish society is highly polarized [sound familiar?], the EU wants to suspend ascension talks with Turkey, and the vote result is being appealed to European Court of Human Rights.  If the opposition wins the appeal, I’m certain Erdoğan will ignore it.

German-Turkish Relations
It seems lately that every passing day brings another incident that contributes to the heightened tensions between Germany and Turkey.   There is a large Turkish community in Germany, approximately 3 million strong.  More Turks live in Germany than anywhere else outside Turkey. Germany started to invite Turkish citizens to work in the country in the 1960s as it was facing a severe labor shortage, and many Turks subsequently moved to Germany as temporary "guest workers." Contrary to initial governmental plans, a significant share of those workers never left the country.  There is a tension between the Turkish immigrants and their German hosts.  Angel Merkel urges Turkish immigrants to assimilate into German society.  Erdoğan encourages Turks in Germany to integrate, but not assimilate so the Turks don’t lose their Turkish identity.  Germany and Turkey are allies within NATO, but you wouldn’t know it by reading what’s on the Internet. 

One month prior to the coup, the German Bundestag voted to recognize the massacre of 1.5 Armenians by Ottoman forces as genocide.  A similar vote comes up in every new American Congress, but because we want to maintain good relations with Turkey, such a resolution fails to pass.  But last year, the Germans actually did it, and the Turks were furious.  Although the resolution used the word “genocide” in the headline and text and says Germany - at the time an ally of the Ottomans - is partly guilty for doing nothing to stop the killings.  Nevertheless, the Turks were furious.  German-Turkish relations have been going downhill and picking up speed ever since.

During the campaign for the April 2017 constitutional referendum, approximately 1.3 million Turks living in Germany were eligible to vote.  Erdoğan wanted to address them – Germany refused.  As a result, Erdoğan said the Germans were using “Nazi practices” to keep him from addressing the Turkish diaspora.  In another development, the head of German foreign intelligence said in an interview that Turkey failed to convince them that Gülen was behind the abortive coup.  Der Speigel quoted Bruno Kahl as saying “Turkey has tried to convince us of that at every level but so far it has not succeeded.”

Germany decided to withdraw its troops who support the fight against the Islamic State group in Syria from Incirlik base and move them to Jordan after German lawmakers were refused the right to visit the base.  Turkey blocked German MPs from visiting the troops in apparent retaliation after Germany gave asylum to Turkish officers who fled in the wake of last year’s failed coup attempt.  The Turks also claimed some German MPs have been in contact with the PKK and couldn’t allow them to visit Incirlik for “security reasons”. 

German-Turkish reporter Deniz Yucel has been imprisoned in Turkey since mid-February 2017. 
Erdoğan described him as a German spy and agent of the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Erdoğan said he had ties to the outlawed Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), claiming picture evidence proved the journalist was a "proper agent" and "terrorist."   German journalist Mesale Tolu was arrested in the early hours of May 1.  Tolu was reportedly placed under remand facing allegations of spreading "propaganda for a terrorist organization" as well as "membership in a terrorist group."

Earlier this month, Turkish police detained ten people [four of have since been released], including German human rights consultant Peter Steudtner and Amnesty International's director for Turkey, Idil Eser. They’re in custody awaiting trial for allegedly aiding an unnamed terror group. Pre-trial detention in Turkey can last for up to five years.  They had been conducting a digital security and information management workshop that had been in progress for two days when they were arrested.  Steudtner's co-organizer, the Swede Ali Gharavi and seven Turkish activists were also detained.

Germany has since demanded Steudtner’s release, but Turkey has responded to the German demands as interference with the Turkish judiciary.  They also accused the Germans of harboring fugitives from Turkish justice.  Turkish officers and diplomats that Turkey says were involved with the July 2016 coup have sought political asylum in Germany.  The German foreign minister complained that German companies are being accused of aiding and abetting terrorism without any evidence, and that this current diplomatic climate casts doubt on future German exports to Turkey.  Germany is also revising their “travel advice” for German tourists traveling to Turkey.  The German foreign minister stated that what happened to Steudtner could happen to anybody.  Steudtner’s arrest might be a bridge too far for Germany.  Given Turkey’s president of perpetual outrage, this may not end well.

“March for Justice”
A Turkish court found Enis Berberoglu, a member of parliament for Turkey's main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP – the party of the republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), guilty of leaking a video that purportedly showed Turkey smuggling weapons to Syrian rebels. Berberoglu was given a 25-year prison sentence.  CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu described the decision as lawless and politically motivated.  As a protest, Kilicdaroglu walked from Ankara to Istanbul, where Berberoglu is imprisoned, while holding a sign reading "Adalet," meaning “justice” in Turkish.  He gathered thousands of fellow marchers along the 250 miles between Ankara and Istanbul.  It was a non-political protest – the only sign that was displayed was the Adalet sign.  Keep in mind that in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, Kilicdaroglu and his CHP supported Erdoğan’s government.  Erdoğan warned that Kilicdaroglu’s march could land him “in trouble”.  But for now, the opposition to Erdoğan [hitherto fragmented] has unified, and Kilicdaroglu is still a free man.  How long the opposition to Erdoğan maintains their unity remains to be seen.

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Helmut Kohl - RIP

As the cliché goes, some are born to greatness, while others have it thrust upon them.  Helmut Kohl became German Chancellor in an unusual way.  In most parliamentary democracies, a successful “no-confidence” vote forces the government that lost the vote to call for a new election.  That government is forced to resign but continues in office as a caretaker government until the newly-called election determines the make-up of the new government.  In Germany, there is what is called a Constructive vote of no confidence.  This allows a parliament to withdraw confidence in a government and allow a new government to take over immediately if there is the prospect of a majority to support a new government to take its place.  Article 67 of the German Basic Law states:

Article 67. (1) The Bundestag can express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.

(2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the election.

This was how Helmut Kohl became chancellor in 1982.  At that time, the ruling Social Democratic Party [SPD - the chancellor was Helmut Schmidt] was in a coalition government with the Free Democratic Party [FDP – led by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Schmidt’s foreign minister].  By the fall of 1982, the FDP disagreed with the SPD over economic policy.  This disagreement prompted the FDP to leave the SPD-FDP coalition and join with the Christian Democratic Union [CDU].  The FDP switched sides, Schmidt lost the vote, and Kohl was immediately sworn in as Chancellor.  Helmut Kohl remained Chancellor of Germany until 1998.

Helmut Kohl died on June 16, 2017.  He was 87.  He was Germany’s longest-serving Chancellor since World War II.  He played a significant part in ending the Cold War.  His part in that was to allow the US to base Pershing II missiles in West Germany.  At the time, the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear-capable SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.  Chancellor Schmidt argued the Europeans needed a similar weapon to deter possible Soviet use of the SS-20 [and any other aggression].  Ironically, Chancellor Schmidt’s own party was deeply divided over whether to allow US deployment of such a deterrent on German soil.  Helmut Kohl’s CDU party had no such divide.  Over the course of two years of negotiations, it boiled down to the Soviets desiring to keep almost 600 nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe if the US canceled the deployment of the Pershing IIs and the ground-launched cruise missiles in other NATO countries.  The US didn’t like the Soviet idea and deployed the Pershing IIs in November 1983.  The Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations.  In 1987 on his own initiative, Kohl decided to remove older Pershing Ia missiles.  The Soviets eventually came back to the bargaining table. Because Helmut Kohl allowed the Pershing II deployment, and demonstrated good faith by getting rid of the Pershing Ia missiles, the US and the Soviets eventually agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons in September 1987.

Helmut Kohl will be remembered as the “Reunification Chancellor”.  He made the reunification of Germany happen despite misgivings from the Soviets, the French, and the British.  How did he do it?  I found this nugget from a National Public Radio article published the day Kohl died:

"For 70 percent of the time that he was in office he looked like he was semi-asleep,"
John Kornblum, U.S. ambassador to Germany during Kohl's final years in power, told
NPR's Eric Westervelt. "He wasn't one of these people out ordering people around. He
spent much more time talking with people on the phone and getting a feel for what
was going on. He schmoozed all the time. But when it came time to do something, he did something."

He was a politician, and from what the article implies, he was a pretty good one.  He listened more than he spoke.  When Francois Mitterrand voiced his skepticism of German reunification, Kohl persuaded him the Germans had learned from World War II, and that the best way for Germany to be a good neighbor was to be integrated with the rest of Europe – financially, economically, and politically.  Kohl saw German reunification and European integration as being two sides of the same coin.  He earned goodwill of Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher [albeit grudgingly] by renouncing German claims to Polish land, by recognizing the Oder-Neisse line [set after World War II] as the permanent German-Polish border.  He won over Mikhail Gorbachev by pledging to pay billions of German Deutschmarks to pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany.  Some would call that a very expensive bribe, but it did the trick.  Gorbachev used to make references to a “common European home”, and Kohl’s desire for a unified Germany in an integrated Europe echoed that theme.  Cynics would think that was telling Gorbachev what he wanted to hear, but Kohl followed his own rhetoric with concrete action.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 took all of us by surprise [it happened the day before I turned 27].  Helmut Kohl was on a visit to Poland.  He was just sitting down to eat dinner when he got word of the events of November 9th.    He cut short his visit and rushed to Berlin.  His critics thought Kohl lacked the vision to make reunification a reality, but in less than three weeks he proposed a 10-point plan for reunification.  In presenting this plan, it included economic assistance, a kind of confederation between the two German states, a wish to strengthen the European Community [“We see the process of regaining German unity as a European matter…”].  He called for a more-democratic East Germany with free and fair elections that included opposition parties.  He sent a personal letter to the Francois Mitterrand, which included a time-line for further steps at the EC level regarding the economic and monetary union. 

As travel between East and West Germany became more routine, the East German political structure began to erode.  This wasn’t due to anything Kohl himself did – that credit goes to the people of East Germany, and to the people of the former Warsaw Pact countries that threw off the Communist yoke in 1989.  But to his credit Helmut Kohl saw his shot and he took it.  The East German Christian Democrats [the sister party to Kohl’s own CDU] and their allies made reunification the major issue for their campaign in the upcoming March 1990 elections.  The East German Christian Democrats won the election and got to form the first freely-elected government in East Germany.  Helmut Kohl had an ideological twin in East Germany - Lothar de Maizière.  Two months after de Maizière formed his government, he and Kohl signed the German Treaty on the Creation of a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, which entered into force on 1 July.  To keep East German workers in East Germany [and to keep them from overwhelming West Germany], Kohl introduced the Deutschmark in East Germany, and allowed East Germans to swap their weaker East German Marks at a through a 1-to-1 conversion rate.  He did this despite warnings from the German Bundesbank.  Once the monetary and economic union happened, the political union followed very quickly.  The four post-World War II occupying powers [US, UK, Soviet Union, and France] agreed to let Germany to regain total sovereignty.  East Germany reconstituted itself into five Länder, and each Länder joined West Germany under the Basic Law.  The reunification of Germany took effect October 3, 1990.  Helmut Kohl was the last chancellor of West Germany, and the first chancellor of a post-war united Germany.  None of this would have happened had not the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe crumbled.  But, Helmut Kohl saw an opening, adapted to events on the fly, and accelerated events to such a point that something I thought would not happen in my lifetime [the reunification of Germany] became a reality.  I believe his ability to schmooze with other world leaders was key to the reunification.

As I mentioned before, Kohl renounced any German claims to Polish lands east of the Oder-Neisse line.  He went one step further and did the same with the Czech Republic.  Kohl made a treaty with them where Germany renounced any claims to the Sudetenland.  Once Germany reunited, Kohl turned his attention to the European Community.  Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand were the prime movers to make the Maastricht Treaty a reality.  Now most European countries have the same currency [the Euro], and travel between member countries is as easy as travel between states within the United States.  While Europe doesn’t always speak with one voice, the European Union that resulted from the Maastricht Treaty is a more-unified Europe, where we are seeing more coordination between the member countries.  The most recent example of this coordination and cooperation is the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia in the wake of their illegal annexation of Crimea.   

More important than the entity that is the European Union, there is the ideal of the European Union.  The EU is a strong pillar of the post-Cold War order.  To borrow a phrase from RFE/RL’s Brian Whitmore, the EU stands for a world where small countries have the same rights as big countries.  The sovereignty of smaller countries is no less sacrosanct than those of the larger countries and is, therefore, unconditional.  All countries are created equal.  That belief has brought peace and stability to Europe.  This contrasts with countries like Russia, who believe that smaller states must be subservient to the larger states.  Countries like Ukraine and Georgia want to join the EU, and desire to leave behind their past when they were vassals of the Soviet Union.  Eugene Rumer’s June 30, 2016 piece on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website lists the EU’s values as:

1.      Respecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all nations;
2.      Refraining from using force to settle international disputes;
3.      Allowing freedom of choice by all states to pursue their foreign policies and enter into alliances;
4.      Demonstrating respect for fundamental human rights and personal freedoms in states’ domestic political arrangements.

Since late 2013, thousands of Ukrainians have died for this ideal.  They want to be part of Europe and not to be subservient to Russia.  They desire to chart their own course, and not to have their course charted by someone else.  In no small way, THAT is Helmut Kohl’s legacy.

Helmut Kohl hung around German politics a little too long.  Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder unseated him as German chancellor in 1998.  Two years later, it was revealed that Kohl had a secret slush fund he could use to help fellow CDU politicians.  The scheme of illegal campaign financing did not enrich Kohl personally, but it did tarnish his reputation to the extent that Angela Merkel, once a Kohl protégé, took advantage of to become the CDU leader [and now German chancellor].  Over the passage of time, this one scandal has receded from memory while Kohl’s legacy – the reunification of Germany and the foundation of the European Union as we know it – remains intact.  At first it seemed that Helmut Kohl had greatness thrust upon him.  But given his performance on the world stage, it appears that Helmut Kohl was instead “born to greatness.”  His place in history is secure. 


RIP Helmut Kohl. 

Helmut Kohl at the gate he opened...


Sunday, December 4, 2016

The Kremlin's Influence

Two months ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released the results of a 16-month study it conducted with the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD).  The study looked at five countries [Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, and Serbia] to determine the impact of Russian economic influence during 2004-14 and the possible correlation to the “general decline in governance standards.”    CSIS and CSD determined Russia “has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making.”  They describe an “unvirtuous circle” of Russian influence, a circuitous flow that begins with Russian penetration of either a country’s economy or political system, each feeding the other that results in what they call a “state capture.”  According to CSIS, the “end game” is to re-establish the bipolar world of the Cold War and weaken globalization.  In a bipolar world, the Russians feel they can wield influence like they could during the Cold War.  They want to influence events through manipulation of media, business, society and politics.  In so doing, they hope to weaken NATO and the European Union.  

According to CSIS/CSD, Western Europe and the United States thought their work was done in Central and Eastern Europe once several nations had become members of both NATO and the European Union.  They thought that since these countries are members of NATO and the EU, good governance would automatically follow.  Since 2004 interest and attention to good governance in these regions waned.  The 2008 Great Recession happened and shook democratic and economic institutions to their core.  And from what this report outlines, Europe as a whole was shaken to its very core and has yet to recover to the status quo ante.  A group of leaders from Central and Eastern Europe wrote and open letter to Barack Obama in 2009.  The letter told him the Russians were conducting economic warfare [both covert and overt].  The measures included energy blockades, media manipulation, bribery, and investments in European companies in order to get an economic foothold in the region.  The new administration did nothing to counter the Russian threat.  Russian economic activity [legal and illegal] has increased, democratic institutions have been diminished and some governments have openly embraced illiberalism [notably Hungary and Slovakia].  

CSIS/CSD calculated the Russian economic footprint by looking at five things; Russian corporate presence, direct investment, trade relations, and private ownership/investments.  CSIS/CSD determined that those countries with a Russian footprint of greater than 12 percent of GDP were susceptible to Russian economic influence and/or capture.  Those countries with less than 12 percent Russian presence were more susceptible to Russian political influence. The countries below the 12 percent economic threshold were Hungary and Slovakia.  They’re at greater risk of political influence, which is connected to Russia’s efforts to deepen or maintain their economic interests.  Russia’s economic footprint in Serbia is above 12 percent of GDP, but their political influence is more prominent.  Although Russia’s economic footprint in Latvia is also above 12 percent of GDP, Latvia has shown greater resistance to Russian political pressure.  The worst case is Bulgaria.  The Russians economic presence is over 22 percent of GDP and is ripe for Russian-influenced “state capture."  

Russia conceals its economic activity by using shell companies and offshore accounts.  And in using these mechanisms they are able to acquire interests in finance, media, transportation, construction, real estate and industry.  The region is heavily reliant on Russian oil and natural gas resources, so it is the energy sector through which the Russians exercises its greatest influence.  Since Russia controls the supply they can determine the prices other countries will pay for the privilege of staying warm in wintertime.  Because they are estimated to be reliant on Russia for 75 percent of their energy needs, they overpay between 10-30 percent than their Western European neighbors.  The Russians take their profits from the energy sector and reinvest them in other sectors of the economy.  This provides these companies with much-needed foreign direct investment, but it also tightens the Russian vice on the economy.  These other economic sectors contribute tax revenues to national budgets, so withholding of tax revenue is another coercive tool the Russians can use.  The Russians can tighten or loosen their economic vice in order to influence political decision making.  The Russians can also create and maintain a large network of patronage that rewards loyalty with increased financial compensation.  Russia has exported its “oligarchic capitalism” [or “autocratic kleptocracy” – pick your favorite metaphor].  Instead of exporting Communism like during the Soviet days, they’re exporting state-sponsored corruption.  

Democratic erosion in both Hungary and Slovakia have come during a time of one-party rule [Direction-Social Democracy in Slovakia, Fidesz in Hungary].  Hungarian Prime Minister Orban and his party have revised the constitution five times since 2010, and they have passed laws that allows for more central control over the judiciary, media and the central bank.  The political left in Hungary collapsed during 2004-14 because of corruption [which became public], fiscal mismanagement, and the aforementioned 2008 Great Recession.  These events allowed Fidesz, a center-right party, to gain a stranglehold on the Hungarian parliament.  The far-right, ultranationalist Jobbik party is pro-Russian, anti-NATO and anti-Semitic and has become the second-largest party in the National Assembly.  In addition to his desire to hold onto power for power’s sake, Orban also uses Jobbik as a bogeyman to justify his embrace of an illiberal “sovereign democratic” model.  Orban is a big Euroskeptic and a big defender of national sovereignty from the bureaucrats in Brussels [Brexit, anyone?].  

In Slovakia, they too have seen a steady decline in judicial independence, free speech and other civil liberties.  There are high levels of corruption in government and in business.  As far as political leadership is concerned, Slovakia is a case of “old habits dying hard.”  Three-time Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar ruled as an autocrat.  His successor Robert Fico, like Viktor Orban in Hungary, likes Vladimir Putin’s top-down “sovereign democratic” model.  Slovakia had made good progress on economic reforms under the leadership of Mikulas Dzurinda, but many in Slovakia didn’t enjoy the benefits resulting from the reforms.  Fico has begun to reverse the reforms of the Dzurinda era.  Fico has his own far-right, nationalist and conservative opposition in the form of the Slovak National Party [SNS], which is very pro-Russian.  Fico relies on the SNS [which CSIS/CSD believes receives funding from Russia] as a coalition partner to remain in power.  Slovakia’s political environment is unstable and fragmented, leaving it vulnerable to exploitation.  

Historically, Bulgaria has been close to Russia.  As a fellow Slavic, Orthodox nation it owes its independence from the Ottoman Empire to Russia.  During the Soviet era, Todor Zhivkov tried to make Bulgaria a republic of the Soviet Union.  As in other former Soviet client states, there is corruption in government and connections with organized crime.  Russia’s state-owned Gazprom is Bulgaria’s sole provider of natural gas.  Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom dominate Bulgaria’s nuclear sector.  Russian private oil company Lukiol controls Bulgaria’s only oil refinery and over 50 percent of the wholesale fuel market.  Russian foreign direct investments in finance. Telecommunications, media and real estate are growing. On top of the Russian grip on Bulgaria’s economy, the political environment is fractured.  Only the center-right Citizens for European Development of Russia [GERB] and its coalition partner Reformist Bloc are the only political parties that resist an overt relationship with Russia.  There are several parties that openly support Russian policies.  Prime Minister Boyko Borisov [GERB] was committed to integration with the rest of Europe, but had to walk a tightrope between pursuing that policy and alienating pro-Russian coalition partners and a large portion of the Bulgarian public.  I say “had” because Bulgaria elected a pro-Russian president last month, and Borisov resigned as a result.  

Serbia and Russia have been tight for centuries.  They’re both Slavic, Orthodox Christian, and share a linguistic heritage.  Russia has long supported pan-Slavism, with Russia assuming sponsorship and protectorship of their Slavic brethren.  Russia has sought to deepen its ties with Serbia even as it pursues EU membership.  As in the other companies, Russia has a firm grip on the energy sector.  Eight percent of Serbia’s natural gas comes from [wait for it…] Russia.  Russia’s Gazprom Neft owns a 51 percent stake in Serbia’s largest oil and gas company, Naftna Industrija Srbije.  Gazprom also owns a 12.7 percent stake in Serbia’s state-owned chemical company, HIP-Petrohemija.   Lukiol now owns Serbia’s largest gasoline distributor, Beopetrol.  The Russians are also investing in improvements to Serbia’s railway system.  Russia’s state-owned banks are acquiring large chunks of the Serbian financial sector.   

Latvia is the only one of the five countries studied that were an integral part of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period.  It is also the most successful at resisting Russian political pressure.  CSIS/CSD attributes this success to two factors.  Latvia has been most successful at deepening democratic institutions and reinforcing the rule of law.  They have the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau [KNAB], an independent investigative body that has not been shy about making cases for prosecution.  KNAB has also led efforts to advance legislation to make the finances of political parties more transparent to the public, reduce conflicts of interest, and improve disclosure standards regarding disclosure standards about politicians’ income and lobbying activities.  Latvia also has a strong and independent judiciary which ensures the prosecution of cases brought forward by KNAB.  KNAB could recommend all the prosecutions they like, but without a strong independent judiciary willing to follow through on their work, KNAB’s work would be meaningless.  Latvia’s population makeup is also a plus.  One would think the 300,000 ethnic Russians in Latvia would be a liability. Because Latvia was occupied by the Soviets for 50 years, they are acutely aware of Russia’s compatriot policy toward ethnic Russians in the “near abroad.”  Russian actions in Ukraine have made Latvians wary of Russian hybrid warfare tactics and their attempts to interfere in the lives of ethnic Russians in Latvia.  The Latvians take the lessons being taught in Ukraine very seriously.   

Recently the Atlantic Council published a paper titled The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses:  Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  This is their effort to show that Western Europe is not immune to Russian efforts at destabilization.  In this report, they name names of the latest crop of “useful idiots” who express support for Russian policies.  Russia aims its efforts at the same kind of far-right, ultra-nationalist political parties they support in Central and Eastern Europe.  Russia cannot exert the kind of economic pressure on Western Europe like they do farther east to attain their political objectives.  They have other tools in their tool kit:  disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare, and cultivating networks of like-minded political allies.  The Russians view Western European values – democracy, freedom of expression, and transparency – as an existential threat.  

Like CSIS/CSD, the Atlantic Council establishes the 2008 Great Recession as the starting point where Russia began to step up its influence in France, Germany, and the UK.  They have been building political alliances with ideologically friendly groups and individuals, mostly with anti-EU, far-right political parties and leaders.  But they have also been friendly with center-right/center-left, and leftist parties as well.  

In France, there are three pro-Russian groups in the political landscape: the far-right, the far-left, and the Republicans.  The far-right National Front [Front National, FN] has been broadening its appeal by getting rid of the more extreme elements of their party – the anti-Semites [including party founder Jean Le Pen], overt racism, Holocaust denial, and radical Catholicism.  Now they tend toward defense of French secularism against Islam, identifying migrants as Islamist and terrorist, Euroskepticism, protectionism, and pro-Russian.  Le Pen and Vladimir Putin have several things both support:  authoritarianism, anti-American dominance, defense of Christian values, against gay marriage, anti-EU.  Marine Le Pen’s party is the only one to overtly accept Russian financial support.  The far-left [the Communists and the Left Party] are less Euroskeptical than the National Front, supports extensive government intervention in society, support a strong central government, and are also pro-Russian.  The Republicans’ pro-Russian support comes from the party’s connections to French businesses that have operations in Russia, specifically in the defense industry, the space sector, the energy sector, and banking.   Some Republicans were openly supportive of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  Former Prime Minister Francois Fillon is the Republican nominee for the French presidential election to be held in April 2017.  He is almost as supportive of Vladimir Putin as Marine Le Pen.  He has consistently backed Putin’s actions in Syria since 2012.  He is also against economic sanctions against Russia that have been in place since Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  Both Fillon and Le Pen are likely to face each other in the French presidential election.  Somewhere Vladimir Putin is smiling.  

The German Social Democratic Party [SPD] has a long history of rapprochement with Russia, dating back Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik from the 1960s.  Their “change through rapprochement” is their core policy.  The Social Democrats believe a “cooperative and integrative Russia policy” would lead to a peaceful and democratic Russia.   This policy blew up the SPD’s faces when Putin annexed Crimea and stirred up trouble in the Donbas region of Ukraine.  The older generation of Social Democrats [Gerhard Schröder, Helmut Schmidt] argued for compromise with Russia, but today’s generation of Social Democrats [especially current SPD-Chair and Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel] favor a more pro-Russia policy that is 180 degrees from current German and EU policy.  According to the Atlantic Council, Gabriel offered to ensure approval of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project that would circumvent EU regulations and weaken the sanctions against Russia.  Nord Stream 2 would double Russian gas flows to Germany and maybe allow Russia to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine.  Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier supports a gradual lifting of sanctions on Russia.  Gerhard Schröder continues to advise the SPD on Russia while he acts as chairman of the board for Nord Stream AG, the consortium for building Nord Stream 2 that is also 51 percent owned by Gazprom.  Conflict of interest, anyone?  

In addition to the Social Democrats, two opposition parties - Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Die Linke – also develop contacts with Russia.  Die Linke’s deputy parliamentary leader Wolfgang Gehrcke says the US played the crucial role in Ukraine’s conflict with Russia [like Putin had nothing to do with it].  Alexander Gauland [head of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in parliament] wants a regular exchange with Russian officials and improved relations.  AfD also wants an end to Russian sanctions. PEDIGA, the anti-Islam movement in Germany, think of Russia as an alternative to the US and EU bureaucrats in Brussels.   

The United Kingdom has their share of Useful Idiots.  Nigel Farage [UKIP], belongs to the “most openly pro-Russian party in the UK.”  He’s been very supportive of Russian policy in both Ukraine and Syria.  UKIP’s money man, Arron Banks, wants to launch a “more professional party” than UKIP, one which has an anti-EU, nationalist agenda.  Brexit was not Russia’s doing, but the Russians are happy that the EU has been somewhat weakened.  Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is a hard-core leftist of the Tony Benn school, as is Seumas Milne.  The Russians like Labour.  Upon Corbyn’s election as Labour leader, the Russian Ambassador to the UK said he had a “democratic mandate” for “opposition to military interventions of the West, support for the UK’s nuclear disarmament, conviction that NATO has outstayed its raison d’etre with the end of the Cold War, just to name a few.”  Corbyn campaign against Brexit, but reluctantly.  But Corbyn is very unpopular through Britain.  He owes his position to those who are paid-up members of the party, not the Parliamentary party.  Most of the party’s MP and their voters aren’t interested in Corbyn’s pro-Russian stance.  The Atlantic Council opines that UKIP, rather than Labour, is more of a pro-Russian threat to the UK.  They posit that UKIP, or the post-Brexit party envisioned by Arron Banks, would attract disaffected Tories or Labourites.  The ruling Conservative party is not squeaky-clean with regards to Russia, but their influence is described by the Atlantic Council as “superficial.”  Robert Halfon, a Tory backbencher from Essex, is linked to Ukrainian oligarch Dimitri Firtash, who is a middleman for Gazprom.  John Whittingdale, Tory MP from Maldon, also has links to Firtash. 

Roll Call of Useful Idiots

France
Marine Le Pen [National Front]
Francois Fillon [former Prime Minister, Republican]
Nicolas Sarkozy [former French president, Republican]
Jean-Pierre Chevènement [Socialist]
Louis Aliot [National Front]
Pascal Terrasse [Socialist]

Germany
Gerhard Schröder [former German chancellor, Social Democrats (SPD)]
Frank-Walter Steinmeier [German Foreign Minister (SPD)]
Sigmar Gabriel [German Vice Chancellor (SPD)]
Alexander Gauland [head of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)]
Lutz Bachmann [PEGIDA]
Wolfgang Gehrcke [Die Linke]
Markus Frohnmeier [AfD]

United Kingdom
Nigel Farage [UKIP]
Arron Banks [UKIP financier]
Jeremy Corbyn [Labour]
Seumas Milne [Labour]
Nick Griffin [BNP]
George Galloway [Grassroots Out, former Labor MP]
Robert Halfon [Conservative MP]