The Kremlin's Influence

Two months ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released the results of a 16-month study it conducted with the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD).  The study looked at five countries [Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, and Serbia] to determine the impact of Russian economic influence during 2004-14 and the possible correlation to the “general decline in governance standards.”    CSIS and CSD determined Russia “has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making.”  They describe an “unvirtuous circle” of Russian influence, a circuitous flow that begins with Russian penetration of either a country’s economy or political system, each feeding the other that results in what they call a “state capture.”  According to CSIS, the “end game” is to re-establish the bipolar world of the Cold War and weaken globalization.  In a bipolar world, the Russians feel they can wield influence like they could during the Cold War.  They want to influence events through manipulation of media, business, society and politics.  In so doing, they hope to weaken NATO and the European Union.  

According to CSIS/CSD, Western Europe and the United States thought their work was done in Central and Eastern Europe once several nations had become members of both NATO and the European Union.  They thought that since these countries are members of NATO and the EU, good governance would automatically follow.  Since 2004 interest and attention to good governance in these regions waned.  The 2008 Great Recession happened and shook democratic and economic institutions to their core.  And from what this report outlines, Europe as a whole was shaken to its very core and has yet to recover to the status quo ante.  A group of leaders from Central and Eastern Europe wrote and open letter to Barack Obama in 2009.  The letter told him the Russians were conducting economic warfare [both covert and overt].  The measures included energy blockades, media manipulation, bribery, and investments in European companies in order to get an economic foothold in the region.  The new administration did nothing to counter the Russian threat.  Russian economic activity [legal and illegal] has increased, democratic institutions have been diminished and some governments have openly embraced illiberalism [notably Hungary and Slovakia].  

CSIS/CSD calculated the Russian economic footprint by looking at five things; Russian corporate presence, direct investment, trade relations, and private ownership/investments.  CSIS/CSD determined that those countries with a Russian footprint of greater than 12 percent of GDP were susceptible to Russian economic influence and/or capture.  Those countries with less than 12 percent Russian presence were more susceptible to Russian political influence. The countries below the 12 percent economic threshold were Hungary and Slovakia.  They’re at greater risk of political influence, which is connected to Russia’s efforts to deepen or maintain their economic interests.  Russia’s economic footprint in Serbia is above 12 percent of GDP, but their political influence is more prominent.  Although Russia’s economic footprint in Latvia is also above 12 percent of GDP, Latvia has shown greater resistance to Russian political pressure.  The worst case is Bulgaria.  The Russians economic presence is over 22 percent of GDP and is ripe for Russian-influenced “state capture."  

Russia conceals its economic activity by using shell companies and offshore accounts.  And in using these mechanisms they are able to acquire interests in finance, media, transportation, construction, real estate and industry.  The region is heavily reliant on Russian oil and natural gas resources, so it is the energy sector through which the Russians exercises its greatest influence.  Since Russia controls the supply they can determine the prices other countries will pay for the privilege of staying warm in wintertime.  Because they are estimated to be reliant on Russia for 75 percent of their energy needs, they overpay between 10-30 percent than their Western European neighbors.  The Russians take their profits from the energy sector and reinvest them in other sectors of the economy.  This provides these companies with much-needed foreign direct investment, but it also tightens the Russian vice on the economy.  These other economic sectors contribute tax revenues to national budgets, so withholding of tax revenue is another coercive tool the Russians can use.  The Russians can tighten or loosen their economic vice in order to influence political decision making.  The Russians can also create and maintain a large network of patronage that rewards loyalty with increased financial compensation.  Russia has exported its “oligarchic capitalism” [or “autocratic kleptocracy” – pick your favorite metaphor].  Instead of exporting Communism like during the Soviet days, they’re exporting state-sponsored corruption.  

Democratic erosion in both Hungary and Slovakia have come during a time of one-party rule [Direction-Social Democracy in Slovakia, Fidesz in Hungary].  Hungarian Prime Minister Orban and his party have revised the constitution five times since 2010, and they have passed laws that allows for more central control over the judiciary, media and the central bank.  The political left in Hungary collapsed during 2004-14 because of corruption [which became public], fiscal mismanagement, and the aforementioned 2008 Great Recession.  These events allowed Fidesz, a center-right party, to gain a stranglehold on the Hungarian parliament.  The far-right, ultranationalist Jobbik party is pro-Russian, anti-NATO and anti-Semitic and has become the second-largest party in the National Assembly.  In addition to his desire to hold onto power for power’s sake, Orban also uses Jobbik as a bogeyman to justify his embrace of an illiberal “sovereign democratic” model.  Orban is a big Euroskeptic and a big defender of national sovereignty from the bureaucrats in Brussels [Brexit, anyone?].  

In Slovakia, they too have seen a steady decline in judicial independence, free speech and other civil liberties.  There are high levels of corruption in government and in business.  As far as political leadership is concerned, Slovakia is a case of “old habits dying hard.”  Three-time Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar ruled as an autocrat.  His successor Robert Fico, like Viktor Orban in Hungary, likes Vladimir Putin’s top-down “sovereign democratic” model.  Slovakia had made good progress on economic reforms under the leadership of Mikulas Dzurinda, but many in Slovakia didn’t enjoy the benefits resulting from the reforms.  Fico has begun to reverse the reforms of the Dzurinda era.  Fico has his own far-right, nationalist and conservative opposition in the form of the Slovak National Party [SNS], which is very pro-Russian.  Fico relies on the SNS [which CSIS/CSD believes receives funding from Russia] as a coalition partner to remain in power.  Slovakia’s political environment is unstable and fragmented, leaving it vulnerable to exploitation.  

Historically, Bulgaria has been close to Russia.  As a fellow Slavic, Orthodox nation it owes its independence from the Ottoman Empire to Russia.  During the Soviet era, Todor Zhivkov tried to make Bulgaria a republic of the Soviet Union.  As in other former Soviet client states, there is corruption in government and connections with organized crime.  Russia’s state-owned Gazprom is Bulgaria’s sole provider of natural gas.  Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom dominate Bulgaria’s nuclear sector.  Russian private oil company Lukiol controls Bulgaria’s only oil refinery and over 50 percent of the wholesale fuel market.  Russian foreign direct investments in finance. Telecommunications, media and real estate are growing. On top of the Russian grip on Bulgaria’s economy, the political environment is fractured.  Only the center-right Citizens for European Development of Russia [GERB] and its coalition partner Reformist Bloc are the only political parties that resist an overt relationship with Russia.  There are several parties that openly support Russian policies.  Prime Minister Boyko Borisov [GERB] was committed to integration with the rest of Europe, but had to walk a tightrope between pursuing that policy and alienating pro-Russian coalition partners and a large portion of the Bulgarian public.  I say “had” because Bulgaria elected a pro-Russian president last month, and Borisov resigned as a result.  

Serbia and Russia have been tight for centuries.  They’re both Slavic, Orthodox Christian, and share a linguistic heritage.  Russia has long supported pan-Slavism, with Russia assuming sponsorship and protectorship of their Slavic brethren.  Russia has sought to deepen its ties with Serbia even as it pursues EU membership.  As in the other companies, Russia has a firm grip on the energy sector.  Eight percent of Serbia’s natural gas comes from [wait for it…] Russia.  Russia’s Gazprom Neft owns a 51 percent stake in Serbia’s largest oil and gas company, Naftna Industrija Srbije.  Gazprom also owns a 12.7 percent stake in Serbia’s state-owned chemical company, HIP-Petrohemija.   Lukiol now owns Serbia’s largest gasoline distributor, Beopetrol.  The Russians are also investing in improvements to Serbia’s railway system.  Russia’s state-owned banks are acquiring large chunks of the Serbian financial sector.   

Latvia is the only one of the five countries studied that were an integral part of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period.  It is also the most successful at resisting Russian political pressure.  CSIS/CSD attributes this success to two factors.  Latvia has been most successful at deepening democratic institutions and reinforcing the rule of law.  They have the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau [KNAB], an independent investigative body that has not been shy about making cases for prosecution.  KNAB has also led efforts to advance legislation to make the finances of political parties more transparent to the public, reduce conflicts of interest, and improve disclosure standards regarding disclosure standards about politicians’ income and lobbying activities.  Latvia also has a strong and independent judiciary which ensures the prosecution of cases brought forward by KNAB.  KNAB could recommend all the prosecutions they like, but without a strong independent judiciary willing to follow through on their work, KNAB’s work would be meaningless.  Latvia’s population makeup is also a plus.  One would think the 300,000 ethnic Russians in Latvia would be a liability. Because Latvia was occupied by the Soviets for 50 years, they are acutely aware of Russia’s compatriot policy toward ethnic Russians in the “near abroad.”  Russian actions in Ukraine have made Latvians wary of Russian hybrid warfare tactics and their attempts to interfere in the lives of ethnic Russians in Latvia.  The Latvians take the lessons being taught in Ukraine very seriously.   

Recently the Atlantic Council published a paper titled The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses:  Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  This is their effort to show that Western Europe is not immune to Russian efforts at destabilization.  In this report, they name names of the latest crop of “useful idiots” who express support for Russian policies.  Russia aims its efforts at the same kind of far-right, ultra-nationalist political parties they support in Central and Eastern Europe.  Russia cannot exert the kind of economic pressure on Western Europe like they do farther east to attain their political objectives.  They have other tools in their tool kit:  disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare, and cultivating networks of like-minded political allies.  The Russians view Western European values – democracy, freedom of expression, and transparency – as an existential threat.  

Like CSIS/CSD, the Atlantic Council establishes the 2008 Great Recession as the starting point where Russia began to step up its influence in France, Germany, and the UK.  They have been building political alliances with ideologically friendly groups and individuals, mostly with anti-EU, far-right political parties and leaders.  But they have also been friendly with center-right/center-left, and leftist parties as well.  

In France, there are three pro-Russian groups in the political landscape: the far-right, the far-left, and the Republicans.  The far-right National Front [Front National, FN] has been broadening its appeal by getting rid of the more extreme elements of their party – the anti-Semites [including party founder Jean Le Pen], overt racism, Holocaust denial, and radical Catholicism.  Now they tend toward defense of French secularism against Islam, identifying migrants as Islamist and terrorist, Euroskepticism, protectionism, and pro-Russian.  Le Pen and Vladimir Putin have several things both support:  authoritarianism, anti-American dominance, defense of Christian values, against gay marriage, anti-EU.  Marine Le Pen’s party is the only one to overtly accept Russian financial support.  The far-left [the Communists and the Left Party] are less Euroskeptical than the National Front, supports extensive government intervention in society, support a strong central government, and are also pro-Russian.  The Republicans’ pro-Russian support comes from the party’s connections to French businesses that have operations in Russia, specifically in the defense industry, the space sector, the energy sector, and banking.   Some Republicans were openly supportive of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  Former Prime Minister Francois Fillon is the Republican nominee for the French presidential election to be held in April 2017.  He is almost as supportive of Vladimir Putin as Marine Le Pen.  He has consistently backed Putin’s actions in Syria since 2012.  He is also against economic sanctions against Russia that have been in place since Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  Both Fillon and Le Pen are likely to face each other in the French presidential election.  Somewhere Vladimir Putin is smiling.  

The German Social Democratic Party [SPD] has a long history of rapprochement with Russia, dating back Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik from the 1960s.  Their “change through rapprochement” is their core policy.  The Social Democrats believe a “cooperative and integrative Russia policy” would lead to a peaceful and democratic Russia.   This policy blew up the SPD’s faces when Putin annexed Crimea and stirred up trouble in the Donbas region of Ukraine.  The older generation of Social Democrats [Gerhard Schröder, Helmut Schmidt] argued for compromise with Russia, but today’s generation of Social Democrats [especially current SPD-Chair and Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel] favor a more pro-Russia policy that is 180 degrees from current German and EU policy.  According to the Atlantic Council, Gabriel offered to ensure approval of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project that would circumvent EU regulations and weaken the sanctions against Russia.  Nord Stream 2 would double Russian gas flows to Germany and maybe allow Russia to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine.  Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier supports a gradual lifting of sanctions on Russia.  Gerhard Schröder continues to advise the SPD on Russia while he acts as chairman of the board for Nord Stream AG, the consortium for building Nord Stream 2 that is also 51 percent owned by Gazprom.  Conflict of interest, anyone?  

In addition to the Social Democrats, two opposition parties - Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Die Linke – also develop contacts with Russia.  Die Linke’s deputy parliamentary leader Wolfgang Gehrcke says the US played the crucial role in Ukraine’s conflict with Russia [like Putin had nothing to do with it].  Alexander Gauland [head of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in parliament] wants a regular exchange with Russian officials and improved relations.  AfD also wants an end to Russian sanctions. PEDIGA, the anti-Islam movement in Germany, think of Russia as an alternative to the US and EU bureaucrats in Brussels.   

The United Kingdom has their share of Useful Idiots.  Nigel Farage [UKIP], belongs to the “most openly pro-Russian party in the UK.”  He’s been very supportive of Russian policy in both Ukraine and Syria.  UKIP’s money man, Arron Banks, wants to launch a “more professional party” than UKIP, one which has an anti-EU, nationalist agenda.  Brexit was not Russia’s doing, but the Russians are happy that the EU has been somewhat weakened.  Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is a hard-core leftist of the Tony Benn school, as is Seumas Milne.  The Russians like Labour.  Upon Corbyn’s election as Labour leader, the Russian Ambassador to the UK said he had a “democratic mandate” for “opposition to military interventions of the West, support for the UK’s nuclear disarmament, conviction that NATO has outstayed its raison d’etre with the end of the Cold War, just to name a few.”  Corbyn campaign against Brexit, but reluctantly.  But Corbyn is very unpopular through Britain.  He owes his position to those who are paid-up members of the party, not the Parliamentary party.  Most of the party’s MP and their voters aren’t interested in Corbyn’s pro-Russian stance.  The Atlantic Council opines that UKIP, rather than Labour, is more of a pro-Russian threat to the UK.  They posit that UKIP, or the post-Brexit party envisioned by Arron Banks, would attract disaffected Tories or Labourites.  The ruling Conservative party is not squeaky-clean with regards to Russia, but their influence is described by the Atlantic Council as “superficial.”  Robert Halfon, a Tory backbencher from Essex, is linked to Ukrainian oligarch Dimitri Firtash, who is a middleman for Gazprom.  John Whittingdale, Tory MP from Maldon, also has links to Firtash. 

Roll Call of Useful Idiots

France

Marine Le Pen [National Front]

Francois Fillon [former Prime Minister, Republican]

Nicolas Sarkozy [former French president, Republican]

Jean-Pierre Chevènement [Socialist]

Louis Aliot [National Front]

Pascal Terrasse [Socialist]

Germany

Gerhard Schröder [former German chancellor, Social Democrats (SPD)]

Frank-Walter Steinmeier [German Foreign Minister (SPD)]

Sigmar Gabriel [German Vice Chancellor (SPD)]

Alexander Gauland [head of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)]

Lutz Bachmann [PEGIDA]

Wolfgang Gehrcke [Die Linke]

Markus Frohnmeier [AfD]

United Kingdom

Nigel Farage [UKIP]

Arron Banks [UKIP financier]

Jeremy Corbyn [Labour]

Seumas Milne [Labour]

Nick Griffin [BNP]

George Galloway [Grassroots Out, former Labor MP]

Robert Halfon [Conservative MP]

The Election Is Over - Now What?

The Campaign From Hell is finally over and Donald Trump won.

Now what?

One benefit of not having voted for either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton is that I can view what has transpired with some degree of detachment.  I don’t make political observations on this blog very often, but I will here.  

WikiLeaks.  I can’t prove that Julian Assange is a Russian stooge doing Vladimir Putin’s dirty work, but he sure played the part very well.  I know Russian television was very keen to hear what he had to say.  I understand that he thinks of himself as one to expose the dirty laundry of the powerful.  I didn’t like it when he did his first “document dump” about the Bush years, and I don’t like what he did about John Podesta’s emails either [just to be consistent].  Just the appearance of some foreign entity meddling with our elections is extremely troubling.  And what is more troubling is that many Americans openly welcomed it, and even encouraged it [as Donald Trump did] because they thought it gave them some political advantage.  While I can appreciate that WikiLeaks tore away the curtain and exposed certain things to sunlight, why did it have to be them, of all people?  I found this statement from Julian Assange very interesting:  

We publish material given to us if it is of political, diplomatic, historical or ethical importance and which has not been published elsewhere. When we have material that fulfills this criteria, we publish. We had information that fit our editorial criteria which related to the Sanders and Clinton campaign (DNC Leaks) and the Clinton political campaign and Foundation (Podesta Emails). No-one disputes the public importance of these publications. It would be unconscionable for WikiLeaks to withhold such an archive from the public during an election.  

At the same time, we cannot publish what we do not have. To date, we have not received information on Donald Trump’s campaign, or Jill Stein’s campaign, or Gary Johnson’s campaign or any of the other candidates that fulfills our stated editorial criteria. As a result of publishing Clinton’s cables and indexing her emails we are seen as domain experts on Clinton archives. So it is natural that Clinton sources come to us.  

Assange asserts that he cannot publish what he does not have.  This begs the question:  from whom did WikiLeaks get their information on the Clintons, and who would benefit from these disclosures?  This brings us to Vladimir Putin.  

Vladimir Putin.  Somewhere, Vladimir Putin is smiling.  When she was Secretary of State, Hillary claimed the Russian Duma election in 2011 was rigged [hint:  she was right – it was].  By challenging the legitimization ritual that is Russian elections [which are neither free nor fair], she challenged Vladimir Putin’s own legitimacy.  Is there any wonder why people think the Russians and WikiLeaks are joined at the hip?  One can’t help but think Vlad is enjoying a bit of schadenfreude.    

Russia.  The only country that is happy about Donald Trump’s election is Russia.  That’s the same country Mitt Romney singled out as our biggest geopolitical foe. Let that sink in for a while…  

Ukraine.  Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have said very nice things about each other.  If I was President Poroschenko, this wouldn’t give me very much comfort.  

James Comey.  The FBI Director demonstrated there are two standards for conduct with relation to classified information.  There is one standard for the well-connected, another for the rest of us.  That made people like me [who handle classified information as part of my job] furious.  We knew that we’d be making big rocks into little rocks at Leavenworth if we got caught doing what she did.  But rightly or wrongly, Comey made his call.  And that should have been the end of it.  But no, he had to say more 11 days before the election.  In July we got the perception that the FBI plays favorites with “the elite.”  Hence the charge the “system is rigged.”  Then last month Comey stepped in it again by making his re-opening of the Clinton email probe public.  With that came the perception that since Comey is a Republican, he was abusing his power as FBI Director on behalf of Donald Trump.  What a mess…Comey needs to go.  Not only has the ghost of J. Edgar Hoover been resurrected, he has brought into question the FBI’s integrity from people of all political persuasions.  Integrity is part of the FBI’s motto:  Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity.  As I was taught a long time ago, integrity comes with credibility.  Once you have lost your credibility, it is difficult to get it back.  

“Lock Her Up”?  The case of Hillary Clinton’s emails is closed and ought to remain that way.  I’ve already said my 2 cents’ worth in this space on that subject, so I won’t say anymore.  The great thing about this country is that we don’t throw our political opponents in jail.  But as of January 20, 2017, the Clintons will no longer be part of a protected class.   Maybe the IRS will suddenly become interested in how a “charitable” organization paid $3 million for Chelsea Clinton’s wedding and other various and sundry things.  Was there any “pay-to-play”?  

Stick a fork in her…she’s done.  This is the second time Hillary ran for president, and this is the second time she came up short.  The Democratic Party rewards failure, but they won’t reward failure twice.  She’s 69 years old.  If she tries for a third time, she’ll be 73, and her health probably won’t get any better.  Her time is done.  She’s had “her turn” and she blew it.  Since she won’t be occupying the Oval Office, her ability to reward friends has suddenly come to an end.   

Will the last celebrity to leave Hollywood please turn out the lights?  These people [some of whom I’ve never heard of] said they would leave the country if Donald Trump won the election:  Amy Schumer, Jon Stewart, Chelsea Handler, Neve Campbell, Barry Diller, Lena Dunham, Keegan-Michael Key, Chloé Sevigny, Al Sharpton, Natasha Lyonne, Eddie Griffin, Spike Lee, Amber Rose, Miley Cyrus, Samuel L. Jackson, Cher, George Lopez, Barbra Streisand, Raven-Symoné, Whoopi Goldberg, Bryan Cranston, Rosie O’Donnell, Ali Wentworth [George Stephanopoulos’ wife], etc. 

Can I help you pack?  Can you take the Kardashians with you?   

The Newly Unemployed.  For the first time since I was in college, these people won’t be holding public office – Harry Reid, Joe Biden, and John Kerry.  Between the three of them, they’ve been in Washington for a combined 110 years.  What will they do?  

Sheriff Joe Arpaio is gone.  And this is a good thing.  

Trump University.  Donald Trump goes on trial for fraud.  Luckily for him it’s a civil case and not a criminal one.  I predict an out-of-court settlement to make it go away.

Enemy Engagement [Feindberührung]

Oliver Stone made a movie about Edward Snowden.  I haven’t seen it, and I’m not sure if I ever will.  While he was making the rounds of the media to promote his new movie, he made a statement that compared our country’s surveillance capabilities with that of the Stasi, East Germany’s Ministry of State Security.  Mention of the word “Stasi” brought back memories from long ago, when the Berlin Wall came down and East Germans stormed Stasi headquarters.  When they got inside the building, they found the millions of files the Stasi kept on the East German citizenry.  What they brought to light was a security apparatus that used a huge network of informants to help spy on their own people.  My interest in the Stasi rekindled, I found a documentary on Amazon titled Enemy Engagement, the story of an East German dissident and the “friend” who informed on him.  What followed was recollections as told by each man to the cameraman.  Then both men met face to face and discuss with each other what happened over forty years ago.  When they weren’t engaged in conversation, they read from the dissident’s Stasi case file [it was rather large].  This makes for some compelling viewing.  

Peter Wulkau was a student at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig, East Germany in the late 1960s, around the time of the Prague Spring.  He thought the ideals of Prague Spring [“Socialism with a human face”] would be a good thing for East Germany.  He was about 20 years ahead of Gorbachev in wanting to reform the system from within.  But he was the kind of student who, when presented with something he knew to be false, would not hesitate to raise the “Bullshit flag.”  For instance, he wanted to buy a pair of pants but was told he could not because there was not enough raw textile material to make pants.  And yet the East German government propaganda said that textile production had increased by 20 percent.  So, do you believe what you have seen and heard in your own experience, or what the government tells you?  In East Germany, of course you believe what the government and the party tells you, without question.  He always found that life experience always contradicted ideology in East Germany.  Peter Wulkau was the sort of person who was intellectually curious – he questioned things.  If one wants to get ahead in East Germany, being “intellectually curious” was not the way to do it.  He was an angry young man because he was constantly being fed propaganda that didn’t jive with reality.   

In May 1969, the Stasi wanted to open an “investigation” on Wulkau.  He was the son of an ex-GDR Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs, who “betrayed the GDR and now resides in West Germany.”  Because of who he was related to, he already had a target painted on him.  At university, he was suspected of “forming groups hostile to the state.”  One of Wulkau’s professors noted Wulkau questioned the working class’ leading role in society, and that he read decadent bourgeois literature.  He was intelligent and very well-read, intellectually superior to most students in his group, but that he was unable to approach all subjects and questions from a class perspective.  He intimidated younger members of his group who had not developed a “fixed class perspective.”  He had an “extremely individualistic perspective” who has “positioned himself outside the collective he despises.”  For these sins Wulkau was expelled from university and not allowed to continue his education.  Wulkau wanted to teach Marxism in high school, but without qualification from the university he would be unable to fulfill that dream.  He could no longer live in Leipzig and had to find “practical work” that would enable him to help build socialism.  He relocated to Magdeburg in 1974 and took work in the Fahlberg-List Chemical Works, because he was allowed only to perform manual labor so he couldn’t do any “political damage.”  

Compared to Leipzig, Magdeburg was very boring for Wulkau.  To alleviate the boredom, he joined a Protestant Students’ Group [PSG].  The group had “Open Evenings” where they would debate literature, philosophy and theology.  This group was under surveillance by the Stasi.  There was a suspected ‘Berlin Scene’ within the group that made “negative comments.”  This group is where Wulkau met a guy named Hartmut Rosinger.  Rosinger had been investigated by the Stasi in 1972 and was given an ideological clean bill of health.  He was true believer in Marxism.  He didn’t see East Germany as an iron-fisted dictatorship, and as for the rules and restrictions placed on society, he agreed with them.  As a loyal Marxist, he was okay with working for an organization like the Stasi to maintain the status quo.  He was quite thrilled and honored to be recruited by the Stasi.  He became what is known as a “Volunteer Operative” [their phrase for ‘informant’] for the Stasi and was given the code name ‘Hans Zimmer’.  Rosinger’s first meeting with the Stasi took place in February 1974 at the Fröbel Special School in Magdeburg.  Rosinger was able to establish a good relationship with the priest where the PSG held its meetings, so the Stasi determined it would be easy for him to penetrate the PSG and introduce “defensive measures of a corrosive nature”.  Shortly after he became a “VO”, he met Peter Wulkau.  

We see both Wulkau and Rosinger in the present day reading aloud Wulkau’s Stasi case file, which is filled with reports Rosinger made to the Stasi about Wulkau.  What amazed me during this whole exercise was the manner of both men.  They are both so “matter of fact” when reading from the file.  There is no anger from Wulkau, but there is regret from Rosinger.  Both are dispassionate when reading from the text, as if they were reading to one another from a novel.  But every so often, Wulkau would interject a question.  When Rosinger reported that Wulkau expressed “negative thoughts” during a PSG meeting, Wulkau asked Rosinger what he thought was negative.  Rosinger replied that he thought Wulkau was well-read on the subject of Marxism, but that Wulkau also questioned the very legitimacy of socialism.  That struck him as being “negative.”  Rosinger reported to his case officer that Wulkau would talk to the PSG about his past in Leipzig.  He also found out that Wulkau planned to write a book that could never be published in the GDR.   

In May 1974, Wulkau formed a “Working Circle for Marxism” within the PSG.  The group’s interest was in reading Marx’s works in their original text instead of what the GDR government said was in them.  Wulkau attended the Working Circle meetings until November 1974.  In March 1975, the Stasi asked Rosinger to find out why Wulkau stopped going to the Working Circle meetings.  His attendance dropped off sharply because he had work, his wife worked in Shönebeck, and he and his wife had a little girl to look after.  Rosinger also found out the subject of Wulkau’s book – youth problems in the GDR.  The Stasi recorded that Wulkau was hostile to socialism, had stopped going to meetings watched by VOs [yes, plural], and seemed content to receive few visitors.  Rosinger told the cameraman that he and Wulkau would do something unheard of – they would debate political and ideological topics.  In East Germany, you weren’t supposed to have an opinion – there was only the party line.  That was the only thing that was permitted in the press – nothing else.  On a subsequent visit to Wulkau’s home, Wulkau loaned Rosinger two books – How Communists Educate Children by Gerhard Möbus, and another work titled Marxist Sociology in Action.  The books were provided to Wulkau by his father, who was living in West Berlin.  The books were smuggled to him somehow, but the Stasi never mentioned the method.  Of course, Rosinger passed the books along to his case officer.  Both books were written in the West and displayed “anti-communist tendencies”.  Wulkau didn’t force the books on Rosinger.  Rosinger was genuinely interested in them.  Wulkau expressed anti-socialist thoughts, read subversive literature, and was about to publish a book the State would like very much to suppress.  What was in this book?  It was a satirical look at the Stasi.  Wulkau read a passage from the book to Rosinger.  In this passage, the main character [named Hubert] is taking a walk while smoking his pipe.  After he crossed a bridge he stopped at a post that had a picture [of what he doesn’t say].  Hubert fell to his knees and began to pray [a spoof of the Lord’s Prayer]:  

Our Father in Moscow, blessed be thy name anyway.

The Kingdom come, from Moscow to Washington and in Heaven.

Give us this day our daily Work.

And forgive us our doubts, as we forgive our leaders.

And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from oddballs of all kinds,

Heretics and collaborators.

As yours is the money, the army, and the press, forever and ever…no longer.  

The Stasi feared Wulkau would deliver his finished manuscript to his father in West Berlin, so that he could have it published in West Germany.  In his own mind, Rosinger thought if Wulkau was going to publish his book, he ought to find a way to do it at home in East Germany for an East German audience.  That’s how Russian dissidents would do.  Publish it at home and let the chips fall where they may.  It upset Rosinger that such a thing would be published in the West for a western audience to consume as anti-East German propaganda.  

Wulkau felt he was being watched.  He wasn’t wrong.  He was allowed to move to a different apartment.  The Stasi became involved in the decision about where he could live so that he can be watched more easily.  Unknown to Wulkau, his new neighborhood was filled with Stasi operatives.  He was being watched and photographed.  Direction microphones were pointed at his residence.  While he and his family were away for whatever reason, Stasi agents would break into their home and photograph everything.  In July 1975, he told Rosinger to limit his contacts with the PSG because some of the people seemed like they weren’t as they presented themselves.  Rosinger went into a mild panic because he thought Wulkau was talking about him.  But Wulkau didn’t suspect Rosinger.  There were others he suspected, just not Rosinger.  Rosinger had a good poker face, which his Stasi masters liked about him.  His cover wasn’t blown, but he was concerned that soon Wulkau would soon know who the real mole was.  During a visit Wulkau left Rosinger alone in the room for 20 minutes.  In this time Rosinger found the typed manuscript of Wulkau’s book.  Wulkau also talked of applying for the position of assistant director of the Meininger Theatre.  He did apply, but in September 1975 Wulkau got a rejection letter from the theatre.  After he was rejected by the theatre, he did something extraordinary – he wrote a letter to Erich Honecker.  He saw no way out of his current situation and asked Honecker what it would take for him to realize his potential instead of wasting away his intellect in a menial job.  He told Honecker he wanted to use his abilities for the service of the GDR, but wondered why the state insisted on keeping him away from even the slightest of intellectual work.  Shortly thereafter he quit his work at the chemical works and took a job as a waiter at a place called the “Green-Red” Wine Studio.  

Rosinger talked about how he would go about meeting with his case officer when he had something to report.  The meetings were always at a location that was neither his own apartment nor Stasi headquarters.  He and his case officer would meet in an apartment that was rented by an elderly couple.  The only time Rosinger saw them was if either he or his case worker wanted coffee or tea.  He described how he had to avoid being seen by people he knew to maintain his cover.  He was quite enthused about the whole cloak-and-dagger thing.  The Stasi wanted a typing sample from Wulkau’s typewriter so they could match it to Wulkau’s manuscript.  Rosinger went to Wulkau’s place and asked to use the typewriter so that he could write an application for a telephone.  It was as hard to get a telephone in East Germany as it was to get a car.  He really did want a phone, but he was creative enough to use it as an excuse to get the typewriter sample.  Wulkau also had a friend from Indonesia.  This friend could come and go to West Berlin because he also worked in an embassy.  Since he worked in an embassy, his Indonesian friend was never searched by East German authorities.  Wulkau loaned his book to his friend.  The Indonesian friend turned out to be a Stasi informant [“VO Anton”].  VO Anton took the book to the Stasi and they photographed it.  Both he and Rosinger continued to gather information on Wulkau.  The Stasi finally arrested him in March 1978.  He was taken to the Moritzplatz Detention Center in Magdeburg.  He had no idea why he was detained, because he had no idea Rosinger and VO Anton reported on him.  

Wulkau’s interrogators tried to get him to confess to his “crimes,” but Wulkau didn’t want to play their game.  During one of his interrogations, Wulkau was asked what he meant with the Lord’s Prayer spoof.  He replied that Marxism-Leninism was not a science but a belief, like a religion.  It was comparable to medieval Christian structures.  The Stasi then put him on trial six months later, where Rosinger was called as a witness.  The two men came face-to-face in court, still “friends.”  Rosinger walked over to Wulkau, patted him on the shoulder and told him “hang in there, old boy.”  It was during Wulkau’s trial that it finally occurred to him that Wulkau was in his predicament because he had informed on him.  He began to have second thought about being a Stasi informant.  It finally dawned on him that he had done personal harm to someone.  The Stasi didn’t blow Rosinger’s cover, and had him continue to spy on Wulkau’s family while he was imprisoned.  The Stasi wanted to know how Wulkau’s wife would react to her husband’s detention.  Would she contact somebody in West Germany, or get in touch with a lawyer?  The Stasi tried to get her to sign false statements, and when she wouldn’t they threatened to take her daughter away from her.  When she asked the Stasi why her husband was arrested, they told her it was possible espionage committed with his father.  They told that story to Wulkau as well, probably in order to get him to confess to writing his book because an espionage conviction meant the death penalty.  But despite the death penalty threat, Wulkau still wouldn’t confess.   

Wulkau was convicted of committing “acts of incitement against the State” and sentenced to four and a half years in prison.  Next we see Wulkau showing Rosinger his “accommodations.”  His exercise area in the detention center was an outdoor 8x10 cell, with stucco walls and a chain-linked ceiling that exposed him to the outdoor elements.  Wulkau referred to his exercise area as a “tiger cage.”  It is an apt description.  He was not allowed to make any kind of sound – no sneezing, coughing, singing, talking or whistling.  The Visiting Room was small, barely large enough to hold three chairs and a table for Wulkau, his wife, and a guard who would always be present during monthly visits.  They couldn’t talk about his case or the prison conditions – just “neutral subjects.”  As for his own cell, it looks like it’s 6x8, big enough to hold two beds and a desk.  Rosinger sat at the desk and asked Wulkau to shut the door so that he can get a feeling of what is what it was like inside the cell.  Wulkau did so, and for good measure he locked it.  Wulkau turned Rosinger’s attention to the peephole in the door, mentioning that the peephole was quite irritating, especially in the beginning of one’s experience in jail.  Rosinger appeared shaken by the experience [especially by the locking of the door], imagining how hard it must have been for Wulkau.  

According to Stasi reporting, Rosinger was beginning to have his own doubts about Marxism-Leninism.  He didn’t want to incriminate people who expressed legitimate criticisms of particular social issues.  He asked his Stasi case officer if Marxism-Leninism was the absolute truth.  Per Rosinger, “the moment you ask yourself that question for the first time, everything collapses.”  The two men continued their field trip.  The next stop was the abandoned criminal prison in Cottbus, to where Wulkau was transferred in December 1978.  Wulkau’s cell was like an open bay barracks which held twelve men.  Bunk beds were stacked four high, and there was one toilet.  There was solitary confinement [“the Slammer”], which held a wooden bed to which the prisoner would be chained.  There wasn’t very much room to move around.  If you pissed or crapped on yourself, you would be punished – called a pig and be beaten up.  Then you were marked as having missed your “educational target.”   

Wulkau was released from prison in December 1979.  He and his wife were disappointed that he wasn’t deported to West Berlin, but at least he was happy to be out of prison.  Rosinger visited Wulkau upon his release.  He sensed Wulkau was more cautious and distrustful.  That’s what prion had done to him.  But, he still hadn’t suspected Rosinger was his informant.  He never mentioned any suspicion of Rosinger about his arrest.  But he reported on the Wulkau’s until they left East Germany for Hannover in March 1980.   

Rosinger:  I must say, I am sorry, that really wasn’t me…That cannot be me.  This is, yes, really stupid, idiotic, isn’t it.   

After emigrating to West Germany, Peter Wulkau got to read and study what he wanted.  He liked his work [he didn’t say what his work was], but he noticed his marriage wasn’t working anymore.  For that he blamed the Stasi – the strains had broken he and his wife apart.  In January 1982, Hartmut Rosinger ended his relationship with the Stasi and relocated to Bad Tennstedt.  He knew he betrayed a trust and wanted to get a fresh start somewhere else.   

Rosinger:  Yes, the details are always the hardest part.  The details are what hurt you.  And which I need to piece back together to spell ‘that was you!’  That wasn’t anyone but my own self.    That’s the hardest part.  And you have to reconnect time and again that it was a part of my life.  That’s the biggest problem.  And now I’m in this situation here, right now, at this table with Peter and it’s even harder for me to take in, to understand.  Very difficult, very difficult.  I am really very, very sorry.

Wulkau:  I know that.  I’ve worked out that I had 39 informers.  All of whom were working to ‘corrode’ me, to send me to prison, ultimately.  39.  Men and women.  You are the only one to have owned up to it, and early on too.  The only one to sincerely regret what you did, and early, this is worth something.  You creditably decided, early on, to face your past and show remorse.  This is really worth something.    

Rosinger:  But it’s unfortunately impossible to wind back.   

Wulkau:  Yes, but I believe that is the tragedy of life, that we cannot take back anything we have done.  That’s just the way it is.  

Rosinger:  I’m sorry.  

Wulkau:  That’s normal. [Cue the subtle, sad music]  

The Stasi had 91,000 full time employees, with 189,000 volunteers to help them watch everybody.  Around 250,000 people in East Germany were imprisoned for “political crimes.”  In 1989 the Stasi left enough paper that if stacked together would be almost 100 miles of paper.  They left behind over 15,000 bags of shredded files, of which only 390 bags have been reconstructed.   

Such is the price for living in a “workers’ paradise.”

Who is Fethullah Gülen?

"Turkey won't be frightened with this kind of uprising and Turkey cannot be governed from Pennsylvania…”  To whom was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referring when he said this after the abortive coup in Turkey?  That would be Fethullah Gülen.  Who is this guy, and why does Erdoğan (pronounced er-do-wan) have such enmity for him?  Gülen, 75, is an influential Muslim cleric who has been living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999.  At one time, he was an ally of Erdoğan and helped him and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) come to power in 2002.  He draws on the traditions of Anatolian Sufism, a mystical strain of Islam usually portrayed as being moderate.  In an article written by Rachel Sharon-Krespin for the winter 2009 edition of Middle East Quarterly, she wrote “he presents himself and his movement as the modem-day version of tolerant, liberal Anatolian Sufism and has used the literature of great Sufi thinkers such as Jalal ad-Din Rumi and Yunus Emre, pretending to share their moderate teachings.” Gülen is considered to be one of the world's leading moderate voices of Islam.  Erdoğan and his government consider Gülen to be a terrorist.

   

Gülen fled Turkey in 1999 because of accusations he tried to overthrow Turkey’s secular government.  He was acquitted of all charges in 2008.  During his trial, a video of clips from his sermons to his followers aired on Turkish TV.  In this video, he said the following: 

“You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence, until you reach all the power centers…you must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the constitutional institutions in Turkey.” 

Gülen leads a movement called Hizmet, which literally translated means “the service.”  Hizmet is often portrayed as a peaceful face of Islam, one that advocates interfaith dialog, religious tolerance and the establishment of secular and democratic government in Turkey.  Hizmet has a substantial presence in Turkish society, including the military, police, judiciary and the media.  It runs a network of schools (approximately 1,000 across 150 countries, including almost 100 in the United States) that are praised for their academic rigor and their commitment to spreading Turkish language and culture.  Critics [and there are many] believe these schools serve the same function as the madrassas do in Pakistan.  They allege these schools indoctrinate children in the tenets of radical Islam and prepare adolescents for the lslamization of the world.   Some governments [especially Turkey’s] see Hizmet as a threat.  The Turkish government sees Gülen’s followers as a threat to use their government positions to undermine them and take power.  British lawyer Robert Amsterdam maintains a blog where he documents all things related to Fethullah Gülen [http://robertamsterdam.com/].  As one reads his blogs, one finds that perhaps Fethullah Gülen is not who he presents himself to the public [Full disclosure - Robert Amsterdam is on retainer for Erdoğan]. 

Hizmet and the AKP were once allies. Both groups had a common enemy, the Kemalist establishment as represented in the military and the government bureaucracy.  But since Erdoğan’s ascension to power they have grown apart.  The two organizations broke into open conflict in 2013, when Erdoğan and other government officials [including Erdoğan’s son Bilal] were targeted in corruption scandals.  One scandal was a “gold for oil” deal between Turkey and Iran that was created for Iran to evade American sanctions against Iran.  This scandal also involved bribery and money laundering.  Erdoğan’s phone had been tapped, and in one recording he is heard to be telling his son to get rid of huge sums of cash stashed at his home.  This and other embarrassing recordings were shared on YouTube.

 

Another source of conflict between Gülen and Erdoğan is education.  In November 2013 Erdoğan’s government announced that it planned to shut down Gülen’s network of schools in 2015.   Because of Gülen’s schools Turkey [and Gülen himself] enjoy prestige and influence in Central Asia, Africa, and elsewhere.  In a January 2014 Op-Ed piece in Foreign Policy Journal, Bayram Balci [from the Carnegie Middle East Program] described Hizmet and the Gülen schools as “a wonderful soft power instrument for Ankara.”  But now Turkey is not big enough for both Gülen and Erdoğan.  Erdoğan claimed his problem with scandals was a Gülenist retaliation for his intention to shut down the schools.  He also claimed the police and judiciary were riddled with members of Hizmet.  In May 2016 Erdoğan officially designated Hizmet as a terrorist group.  Prior to this designation, the Turkish government seized or closed down numerous assets related to Gülen, including media firms and a bank.  Erdoğan accused Gülen of conspiring to overthrow his government by building a network of supporters in the media, judiciary, police and education.  Which brings us to the July 16^th coup attempt. 

The coup failed, but it made for some great television.  I first heard about it at work and started to follow the Sky News live feed on YouTube.  Before I went home for the day I saw Erdoğan giving an interview to a private TV station.  That told me the rebels didn’t have him.  How do you take power without arresting the guy from whom you’re seizing power?  By the time I got home I wondered aloud whether the coup would turn out like the August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev.  It wasn’t long before I had my answer.  Erdoğan called the failed coup “a gift from Allah” and it didn’t take long for the government to start rounding up suspects and purging the system.  Erdoğan needed an excuse to move against enemies real and imagined, and the failed coup gave him one. 

 

The size and scope of the purge [see RFE/RL’s graphic below] tells me the AKP had their “lists” of people to detain, sack, fire [pick your favorite verb], and that perhaps, just perhaps, this coup was staged.  I’m reminded of two incidents in history where a ruler either “left the scene” or acted like he was loosening his iron-fisted grip on society, only to change their minds and tighten their grip on society. 

Ivan IV [“the Terrible”] - When Ivan IV became Tsar, he was only three years old.  His mother Elena acted as regent until she too died when Ivan was eight.  It wasn’t until he was sixteen that he was actually crowned a “Tsar of All the Russias.”  In the interim, he had to reign while the nobility, the boyars, exercised the real power.  The boyars did not treat young Ivan very well.  He remembered this maltreatment.  Seventeen years later [in December 1564], Ivan had enough of the boyars.  He packed all his stuff, abdicated, and left.  Ivan wrote two letters – one in which he accused the boyars of treason, the other which absolved the rest of the population from the treachery of the boyars.  The boyars tried ruling in Ivan’s absence but couldn’t.  Muscovites sent an envoy to Ivan [who was in Aleksandrova Sloboda, about 120 miles northeast of Moscow], begging him to return.  Ivan agreed to return under the condition that he be allowed to deal with the boyars as he wished without interference from the Church or the boyar council.  Ivan got what he wanted.  On his return, Ivan divided his realm into two parts – the Oprichnina, which was designated as crown land under his immediate control, and the Zemschina, which he left to boyars and bureaucrats he trusted to administer.  Ivan also created the Oprichniki.  They were Ivan’s secret police.  These are the guys who did Ivan’s dirty work – mass repression, executions of Ivan’s enemies, and confiscation of boyar lands.  This was the beginning of the absolute monarchy in Russia. 


Mao – The Hundred Flowers Movement was an idea Mao had in the 1950s.  The idea, stemming from a quote of his to “let a hundred flowers bloom,” was to allow people to openly discuss the country’s problems.  Mao welcomed “constructive criticism.”  Those who were dumb enough to take Mao at his word actually made criticisms.  The party began to receive letters.  Wall posters that criticized the government appeared everywhere.  Students and teachers, writers and lawyers began to criticize party leaders.  They pointed out the hypocrisy of corrupt party leaders who lived well while the great unwashed suffered a low standard of living.  When this happened, Mao reversed course and began the Anti-Rightist Campaign [1957].  By the hundreds of thousands people were arrested.  Many critics lost their jobs and were forced to do manual labor in the country.  Other critics were sent to prison.  They were the lucky ones as others were executed.  Mao later said of the Hundred Flowers Movement that he had “enticed the snakes out of their lairs.”  When the Great Leap Forward [1958-61] started the following year to try and turn China from an agrarian economy into an industrialized and collectivized, socialist society, nobody would dare tell the emperor he had no clothes as millions died and the economy regressed. 

I don’t think it is mere coincidence that so many people are being fired as a result of the failed coup.  These mass dismissals just happen to come in those fields where Erdoğan claims the Gülen movement dominates Turkish society.  In addition to demanding Gülen’s extradition from the United States, Erdoğan is also asking other countries to follow Turkey’s lead regarding the Gülen schools.  According to RFE/RL, Uzbekistan closed their schools in the early 2000s, Turkmenistan in the early 2010s, and Tajikistan last year.  Russia has put their Gülen schools under state control.  And now, Turkish lawmakers declared a three-month state of emergency.  Erdoğan asked for sweeping new powers to expand his crackdown on all things Gülen.  Before the coup attempt, Erdoğan had been accused of autocratic conduct, but now he can extend detention time for “suspects” and issue decrees without parliamentary approval.  According to Al Jazeera, curfews could be enforced, and gatherings and protests could be banned without official consent.  Media could also be restricted, while security personnel could conduct searches of persons, vehicles or properties and confiscate potential evidence.  If this sounds familiar, read Germany’s Enabling Act of 1933.  It looks like the mask has been ripped away and the real dictatorship has begun.